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In The Nature of the JudicialProcess,Justice Benjamin Cardozo tried
to explain how appellate judges overcome their individual predilections in decision making.' His thesis was that the different perspec2
tives of the members of an appellate bench "balance one another."
He argued that "out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten
something which has a constancy and uniformity and average value

tCircuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. B.S. 1962,
Cornell University; J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. Judge Edwards served as Chief
Judge of the D.C. Circuit from October 1994 until July 2001.
I would like to thank Jeannie Suk, B.A. 1995, Yale University; D.Phil. 1999, Oxford
University; J.D. 2002, Harvard Law School, who worked tirelessly with me on the research and drafting of this Article. I am deeply appreciative of her sterling efforts.
I BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
176-77 (1921).
2 Id. at 177.

(1639)

1640

UNIVEISITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151:1639

greater than its component elements."' Attrition, of course, literally
means the gradual wearing down through sustained attack or presSure, or the wearing away by friction.' It is interesting that Justice
Cardozo chose this word to explain how "diverse minds" come together to produce "truth and order"r' in decision making. I think that
he was wrong in his explanation. Collegiality, not attrition, is the process by which judges achieve the "greater value" of which he wrote.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, I have written several articles and given a number
of speeches in which I have reflected on collegiality as it informs the
judicial function.6 I have contended that some academics who have
analyzed judicial decision making, especially on the basis of limited
empirical data, have paid insufficient attention to collegiality!7 In particular, I have rejected the neo-realist arguments of scholars who claim
that the personal ideologies and political leanings of the judges on the
D.C. Circuit are crucial determinants in the court's decision-making
process." These scholars invariably ignore the many ways in which col-

3 Id. (emphasis added).
4 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
142 (1981)

(defining

attrition as "the condition of being worn clown or ground down by friction," and "a
breaking down or wearing down from repeated attacks").
5 CARDOZO,sulna note 1, at 176-77.
G See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998) [hereinafter Edwards, Collegiality] (arguing that collegiality among appellate judges facilitates judicial decision making); Harry T. Edwards, TheJudicial Function and the Elusive Coal of PrincipledDecisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L.
REV, 837, 852-53, 858-59 [hereinafter Edwards, The Judicial Function] (suggesting that
collegiality assists with principled decision making for judges in difficult cases); Harry
T. Edwards, Race and thefiidiciay, 20 YALE L.& POL'Y REV. 325, 329 (2002) [hereinafter
Edwards, Race and theJudicialy] (reasoning that "a judicial environment in which collegial deliberations are fostered ... necessarily results in better and more nuanced opinions"); HarTy T. Edwards, Reflections (on Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and
My Alna Mater), 100 MICHt. L. REV. 1999, 2006 (2002) [hereinafter Edwards, Reflections]
(arguing that judicial collegiality helps foster intellectual discourse, resulting in enhanced performance by the court in its decision making).
7 See, e.g., Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1357-58 (criticizing a prior study
for
"ignor[ing] the possibility of collegiality" in its analysis).
See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, judicial Partisanshlip and
Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of AppeaLs, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2169
(1998) (arguing that empirical evidence demonstrates that "there is a significant political determinant to judicial decisionmaking" in the D.C. Circuit); Richard L. Revesz,
Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to
Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1104 (2001) [hereinafter Revesz, Congressional Influence] (concluding that "strong, statistically significant evidence
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legiality mitigates judges' ideological preferences and enables us to
find common ground and reach better decisions.
When I first joined the D.C. Circuit twenty-three years ago, collegiality drew very little attention in scholarly writings on judicial decision making. In recent years, especially as empiricists have attempted
to quantify judicial decision making, the idea of collegiality has gained
some currency. Scholars and judges have noted that these quantitative studies are inherently suspect, because they fail to account for the
effects of collegiality on judicial decision making. ' Thus far, however,
discussions of collegiality, mostly by judges, have been brief and suggestive, usually introduced only in passing."' No one has attempted a
of ideological voting" in the D.C. Circuit exists in administrative law cases); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719
(1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Environmental Regulation] (concluding that judges' "ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit"); Richard L.
Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to ChiefJudge Harry 7 Edwards,
85 VA. L. REV. 805, 844 (1999) [hereinafter Revesz, Reply] (reaffirming Revesz's earlier
conclusion that "in certain cases, ideology significantly influenced judicial votes" in the
D.C. Circuit despite possible collegiality among the judges of that court).
9 See Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1357-62 (arguing that the
"moderating
effect of collegial deliberation" is not properly evaluated in statistical studies that attempt to assess the amount of "ideological" or "strategic" decision making by federal
judges); Deannell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 01110 ST. L.J. 585, 586
("I urge that we go beyond the matrix of computerized decisionmaking to consider the
qualitative aspects ofjudicial interaction ....); cf Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2298 (1999) (arguing
that legal scholars "have paid insufficient attention to the ways in which the vote of
each individual judge is influenced by the views of her colleagues on a multimember
court"); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication
in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) [hereinafter Kornhauser & Sager, The
One and the Many] (stating that the collective nature of adjudication is "[o]ne of the
most salient features of appellate courts[, but] is also one of the most ignored"); Lewis
A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 82 (1986)
[hereinafter Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court] (reasoning that "[t]raditional
theories of adjudication are curiously incomplete" because they ignore the fact that
judges "sit and act together with colleagues on adjudicatory panels"); Patricia M. Wald,
A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 255 (1999) (noting that the "formal labeling of judges" by political party is "the antithesis of collegial decisionmaking").
10See, e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 21329 (1994) (defining collegiality and discussing its impact on the process ofjudicial decision making); FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE
FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 58, 171-92 (1980) [hereinafter COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A
JUDGE] (describing different manifestations of judicial collegiality and cooperation,
and discussing specific cases that were a product of that value); JONATHAN MATIHTIEW
COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS:
THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 12-13 (2002)
(arguing that collegiality among appellate judges "promotes judicial efficiency and a
better judicial work product"); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm,

1642

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW IEVIEW

[Vol. 151:1639

comprehensive, sustained treatment of collegiality-what it is, how it
affects group decisions on appellate courts, how it is achieved and

24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965, 992 (1993) (mentioning collegiality as a constraint on judicial
decision making); Rudolph J. Gerber, Collegiality on the Court of Appeals, ARIZ. ATr'Y,
Dec. 1995, at 19 (offering a personal accounting of collegial decision making on the
Arizona Court of Appeals); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65
WASH. L. REV. 133, 141, 148 (1990) (discussing the effect of collegiality on the number
of dissents and concurrences by members of a federal appellate court); Douglas H.
Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008,
1016-18 (1991) (noting that the D.C. Circuit may be more collegial than other federal
appellate circuits because all members of the D.C. Circuit are located in a single
courthouse); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991-2002,
70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 260 (2002) (citing collegiality as one possible explanation
for the increase of cases reheard en banc during the 1990s); Anthony M. Kennedy, JudicialEthicsand the Rule of Law, 40 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 1067, 1072 (1996) ("U]udicial etiquette [is] a means of maintaining the collegiality requisite to a great court."); Michael
R. Murphy, Collegiality and Technology, 2,1. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 455, 457-61 (2000)
(discussing how the use of technology, like teleconferencing and e-mail, can lead to a
breakdown in collegiality); Francis P. O'Connor, The Art of Collegiality: CreatingConsensis and Coping with Dissent, 83 MASS. L. REV. 93, 93 (1998) (arguing that an appellate
judge's "dissents are entirely consistent with collegiality"); Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A
Ninth Circuit Split Study Commission: Now What?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 313, 315 (1996) (noting that "[a]s a court of appeals becomes increasingly larger, it loses the collegiality
among judges that is a fundamental ingredient in [the] effective administration ofjustice"); Randall T. Shepard, The Special ProfessionalChallenges of Appellate Judging, 35 IND.
L. REV. 381, 386 (2002) (arguing that judicial collegiality "is absolutely imperative if we
are to maintain public respect for the judiciary"); Walter K. Stapleton, The FederalJudicial System in the Twenty-First Centuy, DEL. LAW., Fall 1995, at 34, 37-38 (explaining why
relatively small appellate courts are necessary for collegiality); Tacha, supra note 9, at
592 (asserting that "collegiality is critical in energizing and qualitatively improving the
work of any court"); Deannell Reece Tacha, The Community of Courts: The Complete AppellateJudge,J. KAN. B. ASS'N, May 1996, at 4, 5 [hereinafter Tacha, The Community of
Courts] ("Because appellate judges in both the state and federal system always operate
as either three-judge or en banc panels, the interaction among judges ... has an important effect upon the decision-making process); Deanell Reece Tacha, The Federal
Courts in the 21st Centiny, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 7, 19 (1999) [hereinafter Tacha, The Federal
Courts] (expressing concern over the potential loss of collegiality due to video
conferencing); Patricia M. Wald, Calendars,Collegiality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts
of Appeals, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 171, 178-82
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) (stating that collegiality is "all important" in the appellate process); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with Courts: BlackRobed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 784-86 (1983)
(discussing the necessity of judicial rules and deadlines to preserve collegiality);
Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts onJudgingas Gleanedfrom One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 1(10 HARV. L. REv. 887, 905 (1987) (arguing that
"the major constraint on appellate discretion is probably judicial collegiality"); J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, The Drawbacks of Growth in the FederalJudiciaty, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147,
i173-78 (1994) (concluding that a "loss of collegiality" comes with the expanding size
of a federal appellate court).
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maintained, and how courts with collegiality may differ from those
without it." That is my aim in this Article.
Until now, my own reflections on collegiality and its effects have
been either tentative, formed before I had actually experienced collegiality on the D.C. Circuit, or limited, framed in response to ideology-based accounts of judicial decision making. : Here, I focus on judicial collegiality as a concept in its own right and draw on
observations gained during my twenty-three years on the bench to fill
out its characteristics and effects. Legal scholars generally have given
judicial collegiality short shrift. In making this observation, I do not
mean to disparage members of the legal academy. I understand that
scholars do not have access to collegial interactions among judges on
a court, for most judicial deliberations are confidential. So it is understandable that scholars have not afforded collegiality the attention
it deserves. Nonetheless, collegiality merits serious discussion to generate a fuller understanding ofjudicial decision making.
Obviously, judges can be most helpful in filling in the variables of
judging that may not be readily visible to academics." I do not claim
that collegiality is the holy grail of judging. But it is a crucial variable
that deserves more attention by scholars who study appellate courts.
Thus, in this Article, I give content to collegiality by describing how it
works, observing its effects on appellate decision making, reflecting
frankly on my experiences on a circuit court in both collegial and uncollegial times, and exploring factors that may promote or undermine
collegiality.
In discussing the effects of collegiality on judicial decision making,
I have in mind collegiality only in the circuit courts. I do not address
district courts or the Supreme Court. Trial judges sit alone, so they
normally do not experience the sort of collegial deliberations at the
core of appellate judging. The Supreme Court, however, is a collegial
C1
Cf., e.g., Edwards, Collegiality, sunra note 6, at 1338 ("The qualitative
impressions
of those engaged in judging must be thoughtfuflly considered as part of the equation."); Tacha, The Community of Courts, supra note 10, at 5 ("Defining collegiality is, of
itself, a difficult task. Attempting to identify its characteristics and effects upon the
work of thejudiciar' is even more difficult.").
- See Harry T. Edwards, The Role ofjaJudge in Modern Society:. Some Reflections on Cutrent Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CIrEv. ST. L. REv. 385, 420-22 (19831984) (stating that those outside the judiciary may perceive "a circuit court as consisting of a group of Judges who are woefully lacking in collegiality").
See Edwards, Collegiality, su)ra note 6 (responding to Revesz, Evironmental Regelation, supra note 8).
14 See id.
at 1364 ("LI] udges' views on how they decide cases should be relevant to
understanding how judges in fact decide cases.").
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body,1'5 and commentators have noted the group-decisional aspects of
the Court's work.' Some of the insights generated by the social science studies of group decision making among Supreme Court Justices"7 may lend to an understanding of judicial deliberations among
circuit courtjudges. But I limit my own observations on collegiality to
the circuit courts, because it is what I know best and, also, because I
am inclined to believe that the differences between the Supreme
Court and circuit courts may be too substantial to generalize from one
to the other.
Most significantly, the Suprene Court's docket consists of many
more "very hard" cases than do those of the lower appellate courts.18
The majority of the cases in the circuit courts admit of a right or a best
answer and do not require the exercise of discretion.' Lower appellate courts are thus constrained far more than the Supreme Court. As
a result, in the eyes of the public, the media,judges, and the legal profession, the Supreme Court is seen as more of a "political" institution
than are the lower appellate courts. The Supreme Court also faces
the burden of having to sit en banc in every case. This may mean that
collegiality on the Court operates very differently from the collegial
process at work in the lower appellate courts, where judges only rarely
sit en banc. Thus, my discussion of collegiality does not refer to the
Supreme Court.
THE PRINCIPLE OF "COLLEGIAIITY" BRIEFLY STATED

When I speak of a collegial court, I do not mean that all judges
are friends. And I do not mean that the members of the court never
15 By "collegial )ody" here, I mean only that
it takes a vote of the majority to decide a case, not that collegiality is necessa-il1y present on the Supreme Court.
A New
,Yor
Times article, for example, noted that the Court is not
immune fromIbasic principles of small g'oup dynamics. In a place where little
can happen without a majority .. , the justices are locked into intricate webs of
interdependence where tle impulse to speak in a personal voice must always

be balanced against the need to act collectively in order to be effective.
Linda Greenhouse, Tlhe Court: Same 'ime Next Year. A md Next Year., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2002, § 4, at 3.
17 See, e.g., lE; Et'srtIN & JACK KNIGHT, T1 i CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE 112-27

(1998)

(discussing the strategic aspects of judicial decision making); WALT'ER F.

MURPHrY, ELEMILNTS OFJUDICIALt STRATEGY

12-36

(1964) (considering the

political con-

text in which Supreme Courl.justices act).

is See
Edwards, supra note 12, at 389-92 (defining "very hard" cases).

19 See id. at 390 ("Using rough numbers, I would say that in only
tive to fifteen p~er-

cent of tIe disputes thai come befuIte me do I conclude ...
menl ... are equally strong.").

that the competing argo-
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disagree on substantive issues. That would not be collegiality, but
homogeneity or conformity, which would make for a decidedly unhealthy judiciary. Instead, what I mean is thatjudges have a common
interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law right,2 " and
that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded,
all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is a process that
helps to create the conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all
points of view to be aired and considered. Specifically, it is my contention that collegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role
of partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of differing perspectives and philosophies to communicate with, listen to, and
ultimately influence one another in constructive and law-abiding
21
ways.
What is at issue in the ongoing collegiality-ideology debate is not
whether judges have well-defined political beliefs or other strongly
held views about particular legal subjects; surely they do, and this, in
and of itself, is not a bad thing. Instead, the real issue is the degree to
which those views ordain the outcomes of the cases that come before
the appellate courts. Collegiality helps ensure that results are not
preordained. The more collegial the court, the more likely it is that
the cases that come before it will be determined solely on their legal
merits.
THE MITIGATING EFFECTS OF COLLEGIALITY ON PARTISANSHIP,
DISAGREEMENT, AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
In an uncollegial environment, divergent views among members
of a court often end up as dissenting opinions. Why? Because judges
tend to follow a "party line" and adopt unalterable positions on the
issues before them. This is especially true in the hard and very hard
cases that involve highly controversial issues. Judges who initially hold
different views tend not to think hard about the quality of the arguments made by those with whom they disagree, so no serious attempt
is made to find common ground. Judicial divisions are sharp and

20

Professor Kornhatser's "tean model" oftjudging assumes thait "all judges seek to

maximize the number of correct answers and that the judges share a conception of
'right answers.'" Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by (I Resource-Constrained 7Tam: Hieairchy and Precedent in a JudicialSystem, 68 S.CAl. L. REv. 1605, 1613 (1995).
21 Throughout this Article, "ideology" and "politics" are
used interchangeably.
These and other related terms are used to refer to judges' personal predilections that
may or may not coincide with what the law requires. It is my view that these personal
predilections have no place in judicial decision making.
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firm. And sharp divisions on hard and very hard issues give rise to
"ideological camps" among judges, which in turn beget divisions in
cases that are not very difficult. It is not a good situation.
I should be clear again that, when I speak of collegial decision
making, I am not endorsing the suppression of divergent views among
members of a court. Quite the contrary. In a collegial environment,
divergent views are more likely to gain a full airing in the deliberative
process-.judges go back and forth in their deliberations over disputed
and difficult issues until agreement is reached. This is not a matter of
one judge "compromising" his or her views to a prevailing majority.
Rather, until a final judgment is reached, judges participate as equals
in the deliberative process-each judicial voice carries weight, because
each judge is willing to hear and respond to differing positions. The
mutual aim of thejudges is to apply the law and find the right answer.
Some commentators worry that, when members of a court have
strong collegial relationships, judges may be reluctant to challenge
colleagues and may join opinions to preserve personal relationships.
They argue that "[1]ess collegiality may thus increase independence-a
In my view, it is collegiality that allows
virtue of good judging.""
judges to disagree freely and to use their disagreements to improve
and refine the opinions of the court. Strong collegial relationships
are respectful of each judge's independence of mind while acknowledging that appellate judging is an inherently interdependent enterprise. ' :'
Social science studies on group composition and decision raking'4 offer some support for the idea that collegiality may make dis2
Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Definirng the Role qf the Federal Courts, 1990
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, ExpediBYU L. REV. 67, 72; see aLs'o
ency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNEt.L L. REV.
273, 324 (1996) ("Judges who know, like, and depend on each other might be less
likely to risk their relationship by disagreeing on matters of importance to one or the
other. Over time, colleagues might accumulate debts of deference on key issues, and
subtle, tinartictlated vote tlrading could occur.").
23 Others raise the question whether the principle of judicial independence that
underlies Article Ill dictates that each judge should act without regard to the views of
colleagues. See, e.g., Tacha, supra inote 9, at 586 ("[D]oes the principle of' the indedictate that each judge
penclence of' the jiudiciary, which clearly underlies Article 111,
should act without regard to the views of his or her colleagues, or, instead, should the
mix of judges firom different backgrounds ... qualitatively enhance the decisionmaking process through inleractiol?"). But the initerdependence of judicial colleagues
does tiot impede the indepenidence of thejtdticiaTY as an institution.
21 See, e.g., Deborah H. Gruenfeld et al., Group Composition and Decision Making:
How Member Familiarity ail Iifirt3tliouiDistrilntio Afect P'rocess a,d Pel/ormnuce, 67
ORG'L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 2-3 (1996) (examining how "the extent
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agreement more comfortable and more likely, not less. These studies
indicate that group members who are familiar to each other feel less
of a need to conform and to suppress alternative perspectives and
judgments. Unfamiliar group members, by contrast, are likely to be
concerned with social acceptance within the group.2 This leads to a
tendency to conform: unfamiliar group members are apprehensive
about how they will be evaluated, which leads them to suppress "alternative perspectives and judgments" 2 7 and to "behave like other group
members, regardless of the nature of their private beliefs. ' Unfamiliar group members may be less likely to express views inconsistent
with those that others have expressed. - In contrast, group members
who are familiar with one another have less uncertainty and less anxiety about social acceptance. This increases the fluency and flexibility
of their thoughtsi and reduces the pressure to suppress unique perspectives to avoid social ostracism.
Familiarity is one of the major components of collegiality, and
these insights on the effect of familiarity in groups resonate, to a certain degree, with my experience on the D.C. Circuit. Through the
experience of working as a group, one becomes familiar with colto which members know one another and the extent to which they hold common or
specialized knowledge can affect how groups process information and make decisions").
25 Id. at 2 (citing SOLOMON E. AsCii, SOCIAl. PSYCHOIOOGY
(1952); Charlan Jeanne
Nemeth, Differential Contributions ofjMajoity and Minotyii Influence, 93 PSYCHIOI.. REV. 23
(1986); Stanley Schacter & Jerome E. Singer, Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of EmotionalState, 69 PsYCHOL. REV. 379 (1962)).
26 See id. ("[Unfamiliar group members] are as likely
to be concerned with social
acceptance as they are with task performance.. (construing STANLEY SCHACHIT[ER,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFILIATION:
EXPERIMINTAI. STUDIES OF THE SOURCES OF
GREGARIOUSNE.SS (1959); Morton Deutsch, A ilheoy of Co-operation and Competition, 2
HUM. REL 129 (1949))).
27 Id. at 3 (citing Charles S. Carver & Michael F. Scheier,
The Self-Attention-lnduced
feedback Loop and Social Facilitation, 17 J. EXI'ERIMIENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 545 (1981);
Lawrence J. Sanna & R. Lance Shotland, Valence q Anticipated Evaluation and Social Facilitation, 26J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PS'CI i10.. 82 (1990)).
28 Id. (citing lames H. Davis, Group Decision
and Social Interaction: A Uheoty of Social
Decision Schemes, 80 Ps'CI 0.. REV. 97 (1973); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social
hifluence Model: A Formal Integration ] Research on Majority and Minoiity lnjfluence Processes, 95 PSycioi.. BUL.L. 189 (1984)).
29 See
. (concluding that such members would be reluctant to share ideas that
others haven't previously mentioned (citing ROIERT S. BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS,
GROui' DECISION, GROUP Ac:InON (1992))).
30 id. (citing Paul S. Goodman & Dennis Patrick Leyden, Familiality and Group Productiviy, 76. APPLIED PsYciOL. 578 (1991)).
Id. (citing Nemeth, supira note 25).
32

Id.
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leagues' ways of thinking and reasoning, temperaments, and personalities. All of this makes a difference in how smoothly and comfortably group members can share, understand, and assimilate each other's
ideas and perspectives.
One of the reasons I believe collegiality encourages the sharing of
ideas is that I know the difference between serving on a court that is
collegial and serving on one that is not. During my extended tenure
on the D.C. Circuit, now in its third decade, I have seen the court go
through many different phases and express a number of different
moods. It has gone from a divided and divisive place, to one stamped
with the blessings of collegiality. In 1962, Justice Felix Frankfurter reportedly described the D.C. Circuit as "a collectivity of fighting cats."'
I came to understand what this meant when I joined the court in
1980. On my first day as a member of the court, I was greeted by one
of the liberal judges. This judge's first words to me, after saying
"hello," were: "Can I count on your vote?" I knew very little of the inner workings of the D.C. Circuit in those days, so I was shocked by the
question. I responded by telling my colleague that he could count on
my vote only on those occasions when we agreed on how a case should
be decided. In short order, however, I came to understand that, in
those days, the D.C. Circuit was ideologically divided on many important issues. In those bad times, if two or three so-called "liberal" or
"conservative" judges were randomly assigned to sit together, they
might use the occasion to tilt their opinions pursuant to their partisan
preferences.
In my early days on the D.C. Circuit, judges of similar political
persuasions too often sided with one another (say, on petitions for en
banc review) merely out of partisan loyalty, not on the merits of the
case. In fact, judges might have voted together to hold their allegiances even in cases that had no ideological or political component.
The point was that you were not supposed to "break ranks" if a colleague asked for your allegiance. At that time, I believe, the absence
of collegiality made it more likely thatjudges would walk in lock step
with other judges with whom they shared political or ideological
views.'" There was pressure to conform along those lines, because

JEIIREY BRANI)ON MORRIS, CALMLYTO POISE lITHE
SCALES OF jUSTIC,: A HISTORY
or TIIF CouRTs or TI-u DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIr 197 (2001) (quoting Letter

fr-om Felix Frankfurter to Philip B. Kurland, Professor, University of Chicago Law
School (1962)).
3.1But cj. Greenhouse, supra note 16 (discussing scholar's' speculations
that sitting
together f r a long period of time leads to stahle coalitions and "a greater willingness
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there were ideological "camps" on the court. The absence of a genuine sense of being involved in an institutionalenterprise contributed, I
believe, to a feeling that one was not really free to disagree except
along the predictable party lines. When a court is bereft of collegiality, judges become distrustful of one another's motivations; they are
less receptive to ideas about pending cases and to comments on circulating opinions; and they stubbornly cling to their first impressions of
an issue, often readily dismissing suggestions that would produce a
stronger opinion or a more correct result. Judges on our court in
those days did not like to receive comments on draft opinions from
other judges. In the end, these tendencies do damage to the rule of
law. They make the law weaker and less nuanced.
In my experience, judges on a collegial court do not seek advantage in panel composition. When a court is operating collegially,
panel members focus on what each person brings to conference in
terms of intellectual strength, preparation, and background. So, for
example, in a labor law case, my colleagues may seek my views, drawn
from years of practice, study, teaching, and scholarship in the field before I came to the bench; other members of the court will share their
expertise in energy law, economics, antitrust law, trial litigation, education law, trial court procedures, small-firm practice, large-firm practice, the Solicitor General's office, criminal prosecution, criminal defense, Department of Justice operations, national security, and
diplomatic affairs. In some instances, when a judge on a panel is
struggling with a difficult issue, he or she may seek the expertise of
another judge who is not on the panel. In other words, in a collegial
environment, judges will check their substantive knowledge against a
nonvoting colleague's expertise. This process of seeking and giving
expert advice has nothing to do with partisanship.
On a collegial court, the overarching mission of a panel is to figure out where a particular case fits within the law of the circuit. The
goal is to find the best answer (not the best "partisan" answer) to the
issues raised. The judges also think carefully about writing too much
on an issue and about deciding issues that are not before the panel.
Our mutual aim is to avoid these things. The consequences of alternative approaches are also openly discussed, so that all members of
the panel are equally informed. We are looking for a sound basis for
decision making, not a strategy for achieving one's preferred result.

to compromise in order for the group
Rehnquist Court's "lock-step march").

to speak with one voice,"

accomting for the
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The mental states ofjudges who are engaged in collegial deliberations are entirely different from those of judges on a court that is not
operating collegially. On the D.C. Circuit of today, judges not only
accept feedback fiom colleagues on draft opinions, they welcome it,
and might even be disappointed if none is forthcoming. When a
judge disagrees with the proposed rationale of a draft opinion, the
give-and-take between the commenting judge and the writing judge
often is quite extraordinary-smart, thoughtful, illuminating, probing,
and incisive. Because of collegiality, judges can admit and recognize
their own and other judges' fallibility and intellectual vulnerabilities.
No judge, no matter how smart and confident, can figure out everything perfectly on his or her own. To be able to admit that one is not
perfect and to look to one's colleagues to provide a safety net and a
check against error is a wonderful thing in a work environment. The
result is a better work product. If one's reasoning or writing admits of
ambiguities that one did not intend or legal consequences that one
did not foresee, these can be cured through the give-and-take of collegial deliberation. Whlien such flaws are addressed during the drafting of the opinion for the court, dissenting and concurring opinions
are rarely required.
A very good example of what I am talking about is the recent decision of the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft Corlp. I cannot discuss the merits of the case or any of its substantive details, but I can say
that the work of the court was a model of collegial decision making.
The issues in the case were as difficult as any that I have seen in my
twenty-three years on the bench, and, at least when measured by public attention, the case was one of the most important ever heard by the
D.C. Circuit.
After many months of deliberations, the court sitting en banc issued a unanimous, unsigned, 125-page opinion. There was great
irony in this. Months before we heard argument, The Washington Post
had published an article on the likely outcome of any appeal in the
D.C. Circuit. The headline read, "A Game of Judicial Roulette: Microsoft's Fate Could Hinge on Which Judges Hear Appeal," and the
article predicted that the court's decision would be a matter of "dumb
luck," 'judicial lotto," and "blue-bucket bingo," clearly implying that
the political leanings of the judges would outweigh any other consid-

35

253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ) (en banc) (per curiam).
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erations in the court's ruling.5" In July of 2001, following the issuance
of our opinion, the Post published a very different story. The Post article stated:
Seven judges of extremely diverse politics took on a politically divisive
case that involved a complex record and had significant implications for
the national economy. Defying almost all predictions, they put ideology
aside and managed to craft a ruling that every member of the court
could sign in its entirety. The D.C. Circuit did not look much like a parRather, its judges looked, well, like
tisan battleground last week.
judges-neutrally applying complicated precedents to even more complicated facts and striving successfully to get the right answer.'

A decision like Microsoft is forged as much out of productive disagreement as out of agreement. Through careful, collective exploration
and consideration of the different views of each judge, a product that
reflects consensus can emerge.

The freedom to disagree with one's

colleagues, which is fostered by collegiality, enables judges accurately
and honestly, and without hesitation, to identify what is common
ground and what is not, all the while remaining open to revising their

views. Instead of asking each other, "Wlat is your vote?," judges inquire, "What makes sense to you?"
On a collegial court, if there is to be a dissent in a case,judges will
help one another to make dissenting opinions as effective as possible.
Dissents become more precise, focused, and useful to the development of the law. In a collegial environment, a dissenting judge can
more effectively identify and articulate what exactly bothers him or
her about the majority position, because other judges on the panel
participate in playing that out. The simple truth, however, is that
most cases in the lower appellate courts do not warrant a dissent. The
Supreme Court's practice of issuing multiple opinions in a relatively
large percentage of their cases is an entirely inappropriate norm for
the courts of appeals. We hear too many cases, most of which admit
of a best answer. What the parties and the public need is that answer,
not a public colloquy among judges. A multiplicity of opinions in a
single case can contribute to confusion about what the law is)5 These

36 David Segal, A Game

1J]udicial

RouteIe: Microsof's Fale Could Hinge on Which
Judges Heor Appeal, WASH. POSTi, Nov. 20, 1998, at Dl.
37 Benjamin Wittes, Whatodes Do, WASH. POST,
July 6, 2001, at A25.
38 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 148 (noting
that what is "[rieore unsettling
than the high incidence of dissent [in Supreme Court opinions] is the proliferation of
separate opinions with no single opinion commanding a clear majority," and suggesting that this may signal less collegiality).
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days, the trend on the D.C. Circuit is to dissent less and less,' ' because
the members of the court can see that collegiality enables all judges'
views to be aired and routinely taken into account in the court's
judgments. When dissenting opinions are written, they are more
likely to indicate the presence of truly important competing legal arguments that ought to be presented to the legal comnmunity, the legislature, and the public at large.
THE FALLACIES OF "ATTITUDINAL" AND "STRATEGIC" MODELS OF
JUL)ICIAL DECISION MAKING

Social scientists who have studied judicial behavior have developed two primaly models of how judges decide cases: the attitudinal
model and the strategic model.'"' The attitudinal model, which was
the dominant model of judicial behavior among social scientists for
decades, essentially posits that judges decide cases on the basis of their
personal policy preferences and political ideologies-their "attitudes."'' Under the attitudinal model, judicial behavior is analyzed
pursuant to an assumption that judges act to maximize their policy
preferences and ideologies. Because judges generally do not publicly
discuss the content of their ideological preferences, scholars working
within the attitudinal model have comImonly used the political party
2
of the appointing President as a proxy for ajudge's "attitudes.'
In contrast, the strategic model, which has gained prominence in
recent years, views judges as responsive to the decisions of colleagues.
The strategic model does not reject the possibility that judges act in
accordance with their personal ideologies; rather, it focuses on panel
composition and presumed interactions among judges in an attempt
:It'
See iira note 65 (citing dissent statistics).
'10
See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Themy of Decisionuaking on
U.S. Courts
(?fAI/eals, 58 01 iIOST. L.J. 1635, 1635 (1998) (analyzing the atliudinal and strategic
models ofjudicial decision making, 1n(1 their ability to answer the question, "[I] ow do
courts of appeals judges actually decide cases?"); seealso LAWRENCE BAUM, THE, PUZZLE
OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 90-94 (1997) (disctissing strategic voting and suggesting that
strategy plays a role in both the attitudinal and strategic models of decision making).
For a general disctussion of the attitudinal model of judicial decisi(n
making,
see DAVID W. ROiIHDE & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, SUI'REMFE COURT DECISION MAKING 134-57

(1976); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
AtIrUI)iNAL MODEt. (1993); Frank B. Cross, Political Scieince
and lhe
New Legal Realism:
A Case (?f UiifnrtuIIate hilerdisciplina Ignorarce, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265-79 (1997);
George, stira note 40, at 1642-55; Harold I. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in
CONTEMt'I.ATING CoURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
412
See, e.g.,
George, supra note 40, at 1652 ("[0]n average, judges reflect the ideological positions of the President who appoints them.").
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to determine howjudges influence one another in decision making.""
Under this model, a judge's vote may not always reflect his or her
"sincere" ideological preferences, because the internal dynamics of
the panel may lead judges to compromise their ideological preferences to maximize "strategic" goals-such as being in the majority, influencing the content of the majority opinion, avoiding writing a dissent, or building capital for future cases. Both the attitudinal and
strategic models of judging rely solely on quantitative data to assess
judicial decision making. Qualitative variables-such as what the law
requires, the parties' arguments, the actual content of judges' deliberations, and the nuances of opinions-are not taken into account.
I have never been persuaded by quantitative empirical studies
purporting to show that the personal politics of judges substantially
influence judicial decision making, nor by theories that posit that
judges act to maximize their ideological preferences."" In order to
give content to my views, 1 should briefly explain the nature of the debate that I have had with legal scholars who seek to use quantitative
tools to measure the qualitative work of appellate judges.
My most notable encounters have been with my friend and colleague, Richard L. Revesz, the Dean of the New York University
School of Law. In 1997, in an article in the Virginia Law Review entitled Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,'r' Dean Revesz argued that, in a subset of cases involving challenges to actions
taken by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), political ideology "significantly influence [d]" judicial decision making on the D.C.
Circuit."" Dean Revesz's study principally addressed so-called "procedural challenges" to decisions of the EPA in which the court had re43 For a general discussion of the strategic model of judicial decision making,
see
1-18; Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, The New histitutionalism, Part II, L w & CTS., Spring 1997, at 4; Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Order
in the Courts: A Neo-Ijstitutional Approach toludicial Consensus,42 W. Poi.. Q. 391 (1989).
44 Nor do I give much credence to the theory that jUdges are self-interested pursuers of prestige, reputation, careerist ambition, or influence. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter,
The Objectives of Ptivale and Pblicfjndges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 129 (1983) (hypothesizing that "self-interested judges seek prestige"); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants ojjudicial Behaviom; 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 625-34
(2000) (discussing judicial motivation of Supreme Court Justices and hypothesizing
that they are motivated by, inter alia, repultation, ambition, and influence). But see
Lynn A. Stout,.]todges (is Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1609 (2002)
(refuting the self-interest hypothesis with the proposition that "the modern judiciaty
rests on the expectation that judges will behave in an altruistic fashion" (emphasis
omitted)).
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 8.
46 /d. at 1719.
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at
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viewed agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act's familiar "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Relying on mul tivariate regression analyses that purported to quantity the voting patterns of
judges, Dean Revesz argued that, in resolving these "procedural" appeals, judges appointed by Republican Presidents voted differently
than did judges appointed by Democratic Presidents.'
In focusing on "procedural" challenges to EPA action, however,
Dean Revesz minimized his findings that there were no statistically
significant effects related to judges' political leanings in so-called
Chevron cases."" Chevron held that where Congress has explicitly or
implicitly delegated authority to an agency to implement a statute, the
courts must defer to that agency's reasonable statutory interpretation. ' The Revesz study found that, in deciding Chevron issues, the
judges decided appeals without regard to their presumed political and
ideological preferences.""
When a court finds agency action arbitrary and capricious in a
case involving a so-called "procedural" challenge, it normally sends
the matter back to the agency so that the agency can better explain its
action."1 In contrast, a Chevron reversal is based on ajudgment by the
court that the agency lacks statutory authority to take the action that is
under review."2 The agency rarely gets a second chance to interpret
the disputed statute. lfjudges really wanted to impose their political
ideologies on the administrative process, one would expect them to
do so in Chevron cases, which, after all, have more permanent and significant legal and regulatory consequences. It is telling that Dean Revesz found thatjudges on the D.C. Circuit reach decisions in Chevron
challenges without regard to their presumed political leanings.
Some of my doubts abotIt the significance of Dean Revesz's study
have been fueled by an article by Professor William Jordan in the Ad-

47 See id. at 1759-60 (reporting ihe results of the minllivariate regression
analysis).
' /d. at 1748.

19 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Del. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66
(1984).
50 Revesz 'Environmental
IRet4 u/olion, sipra note 8, ai 1748; see also Richard L. Revesz,
A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarhiip, 69 U. CIi. L. REV. 169, 177 (2002) ("Between
1986 and 1994 ... there were no statistically significant dtlflerences in the way in which
Democrats and Rel)blicans voted on issues of statutoly interpretation.").
51 See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,
280 F.3d 1027, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (remanding the case to the FCC Ior fitrther consideration).
52 See, e.g., Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating
the Secretaty
of the Interior's decision to excIlICe mttte swans fiom the list of migratoty birds protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
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ministrative Law Review.' Professor Jordan examined data similar to
that examined by Dean Revesz, but he arrived at very different conclusions. Jordan, in contrast to Revesz, analyzed voting patterns at the
level of the individual issues raised in particular appeals. He examined
the individual votes cast by D.C. Circuit judges on 133 issues in eighteen cases in which the court reversed EPA rulemaking decisions between 1985 and 1995. Jordan discovered virtually the opposite of what
Revesz reported: Overall, "the Republican dominated panels tended
to favor environmentalist positions more often than did Democratic
dominated panels.""" In fact, this difference was even more pronounced in so-called "procedural" appeals involving "arbitrary and
capricious" review, as opposed to Chevron review. Jordan thus concluded that
[t]he political explanation simply does not seem to fit. It is much more
likely that the judges struggled with the issues and reached reasoned
concltisious without partictlar regard to theji own preferences.

Ideological voting, in other words, could not be discerned from the
evidence.
Professor Deborah Hensler, the former Research Director at the
Rand Institute for Civil Justice and now a widely respected scholar at
Stanford Law School, argues that, because of the inherent limitations
of certain quantitative analyses, empiricists who aim to achieve credible results in the study of judicial decision making should employ
qualitative research techniques to supplement their quantitative data.
Professor Hensler recognizes that multiple regression and its variations can be enormously powerful research tools, but she cautions that
"many of the civiljtustice phenomena that need study are not suited to
current quantitative analytic technique .- W According to Professor
Hensler, in studies of the judicial process, "[r]esearchers simply do
not have available very good quantitative approaches to studying large
social organizations [like courts] or interaction processes [within the
courts].".' Furthermore, she argues that
[t]
he very factors that make the U.S. civil legal system so interesting to

William S. Jordan, Ill, Judges, lIdeolLg,, and l'olicy in the Administrative State: Lassou from a Decade of Hlard look lemaods of l"A R'uhs, 53 At)MN. L. Rrv. 45 (2001).
5,1/d.
at
5,5 I.
51;

74.

Id. at 72.

Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil .]nslice:
Probleos and Pi/aills, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 55, 63.
Id.
57
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study-the wide range of situations that might stimulate legal claiming,
the wide range of opportunities for strategic lawyering [and judging]when coupled with the lack of public information on correlates and outcomes of legal behavior.., raise huge obstacles to drawing valid inferThe limitations on the data that
ences about [judicial] behavio.
supports most empirical analysis inevitably ... leads to skepticism about
these data.
the robustness of any conclusions drawn from

Quantitative studies of judicial decision making thus must be
viewed with great caution. Attitudinal studies ofjudicial behavior, for
example, have veiy limited capacity to explain how judges decide
cases because they leave crucial qualitative elements of judicial decision making out of the equation. Collegiality is a qualitative variable in
appellate decision making,('' because it involves mostly private personal interactions that are not readily susceptible to empirical study.
Regression analysis does not do well in capturing the nuances of human personalities and relationships, so empirical studies on judicial
decision making that rely solely on this tool are inherently flawed.
The fundamental principle of collegiality is the recognition that
judging on the appellate bench is a group process. Too often researchers ignore the fact that appellate judges sit in panels of three
and decide cases together through deliberation. A model that takes
each appellate judge as an atomized individual casting a purely individual vote in any given case will not produce a good explanation of
how judges decide cases. The appellate courts are courts of collective
decision, and appellate judges act collectively as a court in disposing of
cases.

Any credible attempt to explain judges' behavior, therefore, must
take account of the collective nature of the enterprise. Imagining
judges reflecting alone in the solitude of their chambers may tap into
a cultural fantasy of the brilliant, intellectual judge in the tradition of
Learned Hand. BUt as Professor Gunther's biography of Learned
Hand reveals, Hand himself was a collegial participant on a highly collegial court.';' Appellate judging is not a process whereby three soliDeborah R. Hensler, Beyond Proseletyzing:

Some Thoughts on Empirical Research On tie Law 4 (Mar. 15, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
60See, e.g., COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR Ti FEDEiRAL
COURTS
oF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 40 (1998) (noting that collegiality's effects "cannot be
quantified or measured"), available at http://wV.librai'.unt.edLu/gpo/csafca/final/
appstruc.pdf; Tacha, supra note 9, at 591 ("One cannot express the value of collegiality
5'

quantitatively or undleistancd its importance except in context.").
GEiIRAI) GUNTHEiR, LEARNEDI HAND: THE MAN ANDT THEUIi)(;F.(1994);
see,
e.g.,

id. at 288 (describing the high quality of the collegial exchanges between Hand and his
colleagues, die in part to their Use of a preconlerence memo system that promoted
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tary judicial minds reason on separate tracks to decide how to vote.
While ajudge spends much time working alone, the crucial decisional
points in appellate judging occur in the company of, and in active engagement with, one's colleagues. 2
To be sure,judges have personal views, like other thoughtful people who reflect on issues affecting our society. And judges do not stop
having views when they become judges. Nor should they. But knowledge of judges' individual partisan and ideological preferences does
not tell you much about what happens when judges enter into the collective process of appellate judging. The attitudinal model infers too
readily that individual preferences are directly reflected in decisions
that are essentially collective decisions. Group decision making does
not lend itself to the unconstrained expression or imposition of an
individual's preferences," at least not in appellate judicial decision
making where judges deliberate as equals.
In contrast to the attitudinal model, the strategic model ofjudicial
decision making does consider the collective nature of the enterprise
and analyzes judicial decision making as a group process. The strategic model posits thatjudges are sophisticated actors who do not make
decisions based merely on their ideological attitudes. Indeed, the
strategic model sees judges as strategic actors whose decisions take
into account the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect
other actors to make, and the institutional context in which they act. ';
Judges are constrained by, and responsive to, the behavior of other
group deliberation rather than individual decision making).

6rofessors
Kornhauser and Sager usefully distinguish between four different
kinds of collective enterprises: "distributed enterprises" in which individuals act in isolation but "the prior structuring of their tasks assures the necessary coordination of

effort," as in an assembly line; "team enterprises" in which meiners must coordinate
their actions and collaborate during the perfor mance of the task, as in Orchestras and
basketball teams; and "redundant enterprises," which consist of nultiple independent
efforts coordinated by an external structure, such as the judging of Olympic gymnastics; and finally, there are "collegial enlerprises" in which collaboriation, deliberation,

interaction, and exchange are crticial, and the pr oduict belongs to the enterprise in a
"tniquely collective way." KornhatIser & Sager, The One and the Many, spra note 9, at

3-5. Collegial enterprise "involves a shift in the agency of performance from the incividual to the group." i. at 5.
65See I. WVOODFOR) HOWARD, JR., COURTS Oi Ai'Fi'AI.S IN THE FEDERALJUI)ICIAL
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFl-I, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUI'S 189
(1981) ("The organizational principles of collegiality and random rotation... pro-

foundly shape decision making in intermediate federal courts. No circuit judge, however motivated, is entirely a free agent. Judging is a collective enterprise governed by
established rules and routines to which any individual member is expected to conform.").
(A Epstein & Knight, supra note 43, at 5.
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judges. Judges might, it is argued, vote against their ideological preferences in order to influence the content of a majority opinion. Or
judges may be "loss averse," and desire to be on the winning side
rather than register a dissenting vote. It is also hypothesized that
judges may vote against their preferences in cases on which they do
not feel strongly, in the implicit knowledge that other judges will reciprocate in future cases in which they do feel strongly, thereby engaging in subtle vote trading. Judges' choices can best be explained, according to this account, as strategic behavior, and not merely as a
reflection of ideological preferences.
The strategic model of judicial behavior is arguably an advance
over the attitudinal model, because it at least acknowledges that collective decision making is the sine qua non ofjudging. It also takes
note of the importance of the deliberative process among judges in the
production of judicial outcomes. These insights help us get past the
notion that judges' personal ideological attitudes are the crucial determinants of judicial decisions.
Nonetheless, the strategic model provides a foggy lens through
which to assess judicial decision making. An example of this is seen
when scholars attempt to explain whyjudges on the D.C. Circuit dissent so infrequently. In 2001, the court's dissent rate was less than 1%
in all cases and 4.8% in cases with published opinions.' The court
also rarely rehears cases en banc.';'; Dean Revesz has offered a strategic
explanation of why the judges on the D.C. Circuit dissent so infrequently, even when, as he claims, the court is so ideologically divided.
The Dean argues that panel composition determines how
judges vote: a "Democratic" judge, allegedly in favor of environmental regulation, may vote to reverse the EPA in a case brought by

See The Clerk's Office, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
Statistics for
1986-2001 (n.d.) (unpublished document, on file with author) (providing annual statistics for full or partial dissents as a percentage of pul)lished and total opinions). In
2000, the dissent rate was 1.6% overall and 7.8% in cases with published o)inions; in
1999, 1.8% overall and 8.9% in published opinions; in 1998, 2.1 % overall and 9.1 % in
published opinions. I.; see aLo Edwards, CollegialitV, sl)l01 note 6, at 1359 (reporting
an overall dissent rate of 2-3% in all D.C. Circuit cases between 1995-97, and 11-13% of
cases in which the court published an opinion).
See Ginsburg & Boynton, supra note 1(0,at 259-60 (noting that the number
of en
banc cases heard by the D.C. Circuit declined from sixty-three in the 1980s to thirtythree in the 1990s).
67 See Revesz, I;.mnvironmental Regulation, supra note
8, at 1733-34 & n.48 (noting reasons why there are not More appellate dissents, for example, that when a judge sits
with two colleagues f1om the other party, she moderates her views "in order to avoid
having to write a dissent").
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an industry group when sitting with two "Republican"judges favorable
to industry concerns, but not when sitting with at least one other
Democrat. " According to Dean Revesz, " [a] judge's vote is affected by
the identity of her colleagues such that the ideology of the majority of
the panel prevails and the ideology of the remaining member is...
suppressed.""'
By ignoring the possible effects of collegiality-that is, the possibility that intrapanel discussion can lead to a mutually agreeable resultscholars can assume thatjudges make strategic decisions to bury their
dissenting views. On this theory, judges who are would-be dissenters
go along with the views of the panel in order either to avoid having to
write a dissent, or to help foster a climate in which they will be less
likely to have to respond to future dissents when their preferred ideological position finds itself in the majority." Notice that this thesis
forecloses any other explanation for judicial voting. If a so-called
"Republican" judge is reviewing an agency decision favoring an "industry cause," she votes "ideologically" if she votes to uphold the decision and "strategically" if she votes against it. In either event, according to this explanation, judicial "ideology" is fixed and it substantially
affects decision making. A judge either expresses this ideology or
suppresses it. There is no account of the effects of dialogue among
judges. Ideologies do not influence one another; they cannot be
moderated; they do not change. By systematically undervaluing the
possibility of collegiality, an analysis of this sort overemphasizes the
role that partisanship plays in determining legal outcomes. Interestingly, in a subsequent article, Dean Revesz acknowledged that his data
do not foreclose an alternative "deliberation" hypothesis, under which
judges typically vote sincerely, with their sincere views continually
shaped and reshaped by those of the judges around them.7'
"The use of the term 'strategic' with regard to judging is implicitly
pejorative,1 2 suggesting judgments that are only coincidentally related
to a judge's view of what the law requires. But this pejorative inference is based on the fallacious assumption that we must conceive of
figId. at 1732.
6 Revesz, ReyIly, supra note 8,
at 839.
70 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What DoJ ldges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. Cr. ECON. REV. 1, 2) (1993) (discussing "'[g]oing-along'
votin" as an "example of the influence of leisure-seeking on judicial behavior").
See Revesz, Congressional Influence, suira note 8, at 1112 (noting that
Revesz's
prior analysis may be consistent with a "deliberation hypothesis" where 'judges vote
sincerely, but deliberations affects their sincere views").
72 Kornhautser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note 9, at 52 (1993).
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judges' behavior only in terms of a binary opposition between acting
"sincerely" in line with their ideological or other purely personal preferences and acting "strategically" in derogation of these preferences.
This is a paltry way of describing judicial behavior]T' The dichotomy
ultimately has no resonance in the experience ofjudging. judges, as I
shall suggest later, are subject to cultural and institutional forces very
different from other actors, such as politicians or business executives.
More true to life is the give and take of collegial deliberation, during which ajudge's approach to a case must withstand careful scrutiny
and criticism from his or her colleagues."' What results from this interaction can be, and often is, a shift of a judge's initial views on a
case. The shift can range from refinement and recharacterization to
compromise and, sometimes, even a change in one's view of the bottom line. Are judges to be considered "sincere" only if they maintain
their initial views in the face of good observations by smart colleagues
who convincingly point out ways to improve an opinion's reasoning?
Are judges to be considered "strategic" because, upon confronting
colleagues' views, they realize that some parts of an articulated argument have more merit than others, or that some initial reasoning or
language can be changed in the interest of clarity or consensus without sacrificing any principle?
During deliberations,judges must hash out what precisely it is that
the court will agree to hold. Arriving at a holding is not a binary phenomenon that reflects either "sincerity" or "strategy." It is a complex
conversation, both in conference and during the drafting of opinions,
in which judges, individually and collectively, often come to see things
they did not at first see and to be convinced of views they did not at
7.. See id. ("The simple line between strategic and sincere behavior
seems inapt to
mIltiti-JUdge courts .... ); see ailso Caminker, supra note 9, at 2310 n.41 ("'Strategic' tactics designed to 'persuade' a colleague to modily her views ... do not count as 'strategic behavior' for my pnrpioses. If by using such tactics one Justice convinces the second to believe sincerely in rule X, neitherJustice engages in 'strategic v)ting' because
both pirsue theii (ultimale) sincere positions."). Koinhauser and Sager also useftilly
distinguish between expressing preferences and rendering judgments. See Kurnhauscr
& Sager, Unpacking the Court, supra note 9, at 84-85 (comparing the subjective nature of
preference with the more objective nature of judgment, and arguing that "[a]t the
core of' the distinction between expressing a preference and rendering ajudgment lies
the proposition that some questions have 'right' or 'correct' answers"); see also
Caminker, supra note 9, at 2303 (embriacing "ihe coMnventional view that a normnative
account of adjudication should view judges as rendering jtudgments rather than expressing personal prefeiences").
74 See COFFIN, Ti IrAWAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 10, at 171-75
(describing judicial

f
"perceptions, prenises,
collegiality as "uil remittiIng criticism" by oImc j udLge ianother's
logic, and valcs").
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first espouse. As judges engage with their colleagues on a case, from
oral argument and conference to opinion drafting and revising, their
views evolve out of an interdependent push and pull. They do not
misrepresent or suppress their "sincere" views to further a "strategic"
purpose. In fact, it is specious to distinguish one judge's "sincere"
views from another's when all are working as a group to fashion as
correct, accurate, and clear a holding as possible. If the end product
looks different from what ajudge had in mind at the beginning of the
process, that fact reflects the very nature of the group process in
which each judge can only contribute to a group product that is ultimately attributable to the court. The group enterprise may result in
the omission of some of an individual judge's unique reasoning and
turns of phrase because otherjudges find them unclear or inaccurate.
This is neither suspect nor tragic, for a judge's job is not "selfexpression" through the law. It is to decide cases accurately and
clearly in concert with colleagues.
To characterize this phenomenon as judges "strategically" deciding against their "sincere" preferences in their interactions with colleagues is a bit perverse. The theorists who embrace this construct of
judicial decision making seem to me to be seduced by the extreme
simplicity of the model. Because they can only "measure" two variables-judges' political parties and case outcomes-they fall into the
trap of thinking that these two variables are sufficient to model a very
complex process. Where theorists of the strategic model might see a
judge sacrificing his or her principles or convictions to respond to colleagues' pressure, I see a judge who is open and responsive to colleagues' arguments, criticisms, and insights, with the result being the
thoughtful and efficient development of a judicial outcome through
the deliberative process.
The strategic model suggests that judges, on occasion, suppress
preferences in the service of achieving larger personal or ideological
goals. And under the strategic model, no matter how ajudge votes"sincerely" or "strategically"-the votes only coinciden tally correspond
with what the law requires. This is a disquieting view of the judicial
enterprise, and it has the unfortunate effect of badly distorting the
public's view of howjudges operate.
Deliberations among judges are characterized more accurately as
a process of dialogue, persuasion, and revision. To be sure,judges do
develop a familiarity with their colleagues' inclinations, habits of
mind, and patterns of reasoning. Over time, they may be able to anticipate how colleagues will approach issues. This is all part of getting
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to know how one's colleagues think. Of course this knowledge affects
how judges frame and present their arguments to other judges.
Sometimes a judge will express reservations with the majority reasoning and wait to see how an opinion "writes" before deciding whether
to join. And the writing judge may draft the opinion in a way that is
more likely to bring the hesitating judge on board. These are not
strategic sacrifices of principle, exchanges of votes for changes in
opinion content, or the trading of votes for future votes. Rather, they
are the expression of the consensual process by which the precise contours of agreement or disagreement among several judicial minds take
shape in a given case. A judgment, after all, is the agreement of the
majority of a panel on a precise holding. And coming to a multijudge
agreement is not a straightforward matter of voting for one side or another. Rather, it is a complex interplay of reasoning that may be overlapping, contiguous, related, or opposed, and which must, if we do
our job well, ultimately distill to a clear holding that tells the parties
and future litigants what the law is.
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS IN FURTHERANCE OF COLLEGIALITY

There is one other social science model that seeks to shed light on
judicial decision making: "new institutionalism."" The proponents of
this model "treat[] courts as institutions rather than as platforms for
the display of individual [udges'] attitudes. ,7' These "law-and-courts"
scholars thus recognize that strategic behavior does not paint the full
picture ofjudicial motivation. It is of course possible to define institutions in strategic terms and to characterize institutional behavior as
strategic self-promotion. But this rational choice approach is not very
good at capturing our conventional understanding of courts or the
motivations that judges as institutional actors might possess.77 Profes-

75

A good example is Howard Gillman, The Ne, Instittionalism, 'ail 1: More and

Less than Strate D,: Some Advantages to Inteqretsive Institutionalism in the Analysis ofJudicial
Politics,
LAW & CA's., Winter 1996-97, at 6.
76 Id.at 6. Gillman's approach, "interpretive-historical institutionalism,"
presents
an alternative to rational choice/gamle theory institutionalism, and intends to shed
light on dimensions of institutions "that are not usefully described as strategic." Howard Gillnan, Placing indicial Motives in. Context: A Response to Lee Epstein andjtack Knight,
LAW & CTS., Spring 1997, at 10, 10-11.
77 Legal scholars have recently used rational choice theory to study the Supreme
Court's relation to other institutions within the governmental system. See, e.g., DANIEl.
A. FARBER & PtHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CIHoICE 3-5 (1991) (analyzing the implications of public choice for the American legal system); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statntoiy Intipretation Decisions, 101 YAu,, L.J.331, 354-59
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sor Howard Gillman, a proponent of the new institutionalism model,
suggests that, "in the absence of evidence that institutional actors
transform all nonstrategic missions into strategic opportunities," we
should adopt a concept of institutions that can accommodate a variety
of normative goals, including
(a) experiences of duty and professional obligation, (b) understandings
of shared purpose, (c) concerns about the maintenance of corporate
authority or legitimacy, and (d) participation in a routine-each of which
suggest the presence of a kind of motivation [that is] something other
than rational, self-interested, strategic, and calculating.

Rogers Smith, another proponent of the model, notes that institutions "influence the self-conception of those who occupy roles defined
by them in ways that can give those persons distinctively 'institutional'
perspectives. ' '
There is little doubt that institutional perspectives inform the judicial function as judges internalize the institutional mission of the
judiciary. Institutional rules and norms motivate judges to behave in
ways that further the institutional mission. They help to form judges'
motivations and influence how they do their job." Thus, the new institutionalism model provides a more useful framework for assessing
judicial decision making than the attitudinal and strategic models.
In my view, "institution" broadly includes the rule of law, not just
the court on which a judge sits, or local circuit precedent. Judges do
feel loyalty to their own courts. But we also feel loyalty to the federal
courts and the U.S. judiciary generally. We have fellow feeling even

(1991) (analyzing the public choice model's discussion of the Court, Congress, and
the President in statutory interpretation); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive
Theoty of Statulowy Interpretation,12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263-64 (1992) (examining judicial statutory interpretations as "reflecting the strategic setting in which they
are announced," particularly in regard to both the Congress that enacted a particular
statute and the Congress that sits contemporaneous to the Court's interpretation).
78 Gillman, supra note 75,
at 8.
79 Rogers M. Smith, PoliticalJurisprudence,
the "Newv Institutionalism," and the Future of
Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 89, 95 (1988).
80Although I do not favor the characterization in Judge Posner's analogy of the
pleasure ofjudging to the utility one gains from playing a game according to its rules
even when one can get away with cheating, see Posner, supra note 70, at 28-30 (comparing the role ofjudging to the role of playing a game and noting that in either case it is
the act of complying with the rules that allows one to know one is successfully playing
the role, and to enjoy playing the role), my institutionalist argument here is not completely dissimilar in some respects. That is,judges gain satisfaction from playing by the
"institutional rules of judging" and become invested in playing the judge role according to the rules.
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forjudges abroad. But most fundamentally, we feel that we owe a duty
to the law itself.
Collegiality plays a very important role in "institutionalizing"
judges into this shared mission. An institutional mission can find expression in the "collection of structures, procedures, rules, and customs that characterize the experience of being associated with a particular corporate form."8 These rules are normally promulgated by
the members of a court, so the judges have a real stake in their enforcement. The consequence is a cross-fertilizing effect between collegiality and internal rules. Collegiality fosters the promulgation of
institutional rules, and the presence of these rules promotes collegiality.
On the D.C. Circuit (and on other federal appellate courts as
well), internal operating rules and procedures facilitate cooperation
amongjudges and infuse quotidian interactions with a sense of shared
purpose. For example, on the D.C. Circuit, the random assignment of
judges to cases is mitigated by the rule that every judge must sit with
every other active judge on the court at least four times in a term.
This rule ensures that each judge works with every other judge. It
prevents any one group ofjudges from sitting together too often and
promotes familiarity and good working relationships among alljudges
on the court. It also ensures the appearance of fairness from a public
perspective. Randomness is "fair," but will not always appear fair.
This rule is an example of how the promotion of collegiality among
judges and the fulfillment of institutional goals are inextricably intertwined and cross-fertilizing. It strengthens the institutional mission of
the court when all judges are familiar with each other in their work.
The rule also promotes collegiality.
Another rule that has been important to the rise in collegiality on
the D.C. Circuit is an agreement among the judges that, absent a
grave emergency, the court will not use visiting judges to decide cases
on our docket.8 2 This rule implies no disrespect for our judicial colleagues from other courts. Rather, working without visiting judges allows us to interact with fewer outside distractions. The D.C. Circuit
docket largely consists of very dense administrative law cases in appeals that often include huge records and numerous parties with their
numerous briefs. It is not an inviting caseload forjudges who are not

SI Gillman, supra note 75, at 8.
82 The D.C. CircUit "has not sat with a Visiting judge since at least mid-1994."

Ginsburg & Boynton, supra note 10, at 259.
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used to it. To ensure expeditious issuance of our decisions, balanced
work assignments among ourjudges, and coherence in the law of the
circuit, we decided that only the judges of the court should do the
work of our court. The rule allows us to maintain tight control over
the law of the circuit. We can monitor and react to one another very
closely. I have noticed the impact of this rule on the cohesiveness of
both the group and circuit law. In my view, the adoption of this rule
in the early-1990s represented a crucial turning point for the D.C.
Circuit at a time when collegiality was at a low point.
Deliberation is one of the most important components of collegiality. Rules that structure our deliberations ensure that we deal with
substantive ideas effectively as a group. For example, the most senior
active judge presides during conferences, and judges speak in inverse
order of seniority. The seniorjudge in the majority assigns opinions.
Although simple, these rules help keep our conferences professional,
respectful, and orderly. Collegiality does not consist of spontaneous
conversations by the water cooler. It consists primarily of ordered deliberation in which all views are aired and considered to everyjudge's
satisfaction.
Once opinions are assigned, there are rules that govern the circulation of opinions, for collegial deliberation is most effective when
there is a text with which to work. For example, on the D.C. Circuit,
judges who have been assigned to write opinions must endeavor to
circulate draft opinions within ninety days of assignment. Judges must
respond to draft opinions by panel members within five days. Prior to
issuance, a majority opinion must be circulated to the entire court for
seven days. If a judge wants to write a separate concurring or dissenting opinion, she or he must do it within thirty days after the third
judge has concurred in the majority opinion. And a judge who has
three or more assigned opinions pending from a term that are not in
circulation to the panel by August 15 is not allowed to sit on any new
cases until this backlog is cleared.
These rules are taken very seriously by the members of the court.
They structure the paths by which judges collaborate on opinions and

83 Michael Abramowicz proposes that en banc lecisions should be made entirely by
visiting judges randomly selected from other circuits to decrease circuit parochialism.
See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COiUM. L. REv. 1600, 1619 (2000)
("Using visiting en bancs will ensure that panel decisions are subject to a form of outside review, rather than review by judges' immediate colleagues."). In my view, this
proposal would have huge costs for collegiality and for the coherence of circtuit precedent.
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share ideas about how a disposition of the court can be improved in
accuracy and clarity. The deadlines ensure that work gets done expeditiously, and they protect against maverick behavior that might run
counter to the court's mission. But the most important function of
the rules, I think, is to establish a common routine and understanding
about how we do our work together. When all the judges subscribe to
common norms about how to work together and how to offer criticisms and suggestions, it sets the expectation that this is a shared endeavor."" These group norms also free up judges to disagree with each
other and to write separately, because there are rules that tell us how
to do so. With these rules, newjudges who join the court are brought
into the fold of common understanding of institutional workings.s5
Again, a judge's experience of "institutionalization" and the experience of collegiality and collaboration are intertwined and crossfertilizing.
DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH IN FURTHERANCE OF COLLEGIALITY

The term "collegiality" may evoke the clubbiness, exclusivity, and
homogeneity found among certain privileged classes of people and
elite institutions in society. The idea of collegiality among judges
perhaps conjures up images of wood-paneled chambers in which
judges make plans to play golf." The collegiality which I have thus far
described is obviously very different from this. The collegiality of
which I speak embodies an ideal of diversity and envisions judges
drawing on their differences in the process of working together to get
the law right.
There are two major types of "diversity." Researchers on group
decision making typically focus on diversity in terms of variations in
expertise or information. Researchers on organizational demography
focus on characteristics such as age, race, and sex. There are some in84 Cf. Paul

Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, ilntegrated Models of Judicial Dissent, 55 J.
POL. 914, 920 (1993) ("[T]he neo-institutional approach toJUdicial decision making
stresses the independent role of standard operating rules, external decisional rules,
and organizational structures in defining the values, norms, and interests of the judicial institution.").
8.5
See HOWARD, snna note 63, at 222-25 (discussing "freshman socialization"
in the
federal judiciary).
Cf William L.Reynolds & William M. Rich man,Justice and Moreludges, 15J.L. &
POL. 559, 563 (1999) (noting that the "discredited and elitist collegiality of old-boysand-girls sitting-around-sipping-sherry" is different from the "collegiality of judges who
know one another well enough to think alike and through that group think to achieve
a coherent and stable body of law").
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teresting and useful precepts to be drawn from this research, even
though certain findings are superficially inconsistent. In the end,
however, as I will explain, the findings are not inconsistent with the
conclusion that both forms of diversity enhance collegiality in judicial
decision making.
The research on diversity in organizations suggests a diversity
paradox. Under several major theories, the bulk of the evidence suggests that diversity is likely to impede group functioning in organizations. However, information and decision-making theories posit that
variance in group composition can make for better decisions because
of an increase in the skills, abilities, information, and knowledge that
88
diversity brings. Diversity is thus valuable when it brings a rich range
of information and perspectives. " ' Yet, the same heterogeneity that
provides for different perspectives and the "cognitive conflict" that
can lead to better decisions may also result in increased emotional
conflict, which impedes group functioning.!
Research on the interaction between informational diversity and
member familiarity in groups suggests another paradox:
[T] he more familiar group members are with one another, the less likely
they are to possess unique knowledge or different points of view. Thus,
while familiar groups may be better equipped psychologically to resolve
conflicts effectively, they may be less likely than stranger groups to experience the knowledge asymmetries fiom which cognitive conflicts arise.
On the other hand, groups of strangers are likely to know different facts
and have different perspectives, but they may lack the social ties and indiversity.
terpersonal knowledge to tap into the spoils of their

This suggests that the ideal group performance could be expected
from groups composed of diverse yet familiar members. In other
words, without familiarity, it is difficult for the group to take advan-

87 See Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O'Reilly,
Ill, Demography and Diversity in
Organizations: A Reniew of 40 Years of Research, it 20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL

BEHAVIOR:

AN ANNUAL SERIES OF ANALYJ [CAL ESSAYS AND CRITri[cL REVIEws

77, 121

(Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1998) (reviewing forty years of empirical research as suggesting that group heterogeneity may result in better decisions but also
increased emotional conflict).
88

Id. at 86-87.

See id. at 87 ("Researchers largely agree that functional or background diversity
provides the range of knowledge, skills and contacts that enhances problem solving .. "); see also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirnative Action: Reclaimilg the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1024 (1996) (citing studies finding that diversity leads to better decision making in workplaces and injuries).
90 Williams & O'Reilly, supra
note 87, at 90-121.
il Gruenfeld et al., supra note 24, at
12-13.
89
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tage of the unique knowledge and perspectives that each diverse
member may have to share.
I have experienced the benefits of diversity in expertise, knowledge, and information among my colleagues on the bench. It is clear
to me that when the court has been collegial, this diversity has improved our decision making. Differences in professional and personal
background, areas of expertise, and ideological perspectives make the
deliberative process more lively, rich, and thorough. In ajudicial environment in which collegial relations are fostered, diversity among
the judges makes for better-informed discussion. As I have written
elsewhere, diversity in a collegial setting
provides for constant input from judges who have seen different kinds of
problems in their prejiudicial careers, and have sometimes seen the
same problems from different angles. A deliberative process enhanced
by collegiality and a broad range of perspectives necessarily results in
better and more nuanced opinions-opinions which, while remaining
true to the rule of law, over time allow for a fuller and richer evolution
of the law,

Recognizing the importance of diversity can undermine some reductive assumptions that inform certain scholars' work on judging.
For example, judges who are assigned to a particular political category, such as "liberal" or "conservative," or Democratic or Republican,
are often assumed to be of like mind and to have policy preferences
on most substantive legal issues that are indexed with these political
labels!' This is likely to be accurate in an uncollegial environment,
because judges are more likely to flatten out their differences and allow themselves to be grouped into the most obvious categories available. Just the opposite happens on a collegial court. As our court has
become more collegial, I have seen my colleagues become familiar
with each other along a variety of dimensions. As a result, the party of
the appointing President recedes in importance and the multitude of
other characteristics differentiating each judge comes to the fore.
When this multidimensional diversity became visible, judges began to
encounter each others' differences without the battle mentality that
existed in my earlier days on the D.C. Circuit. As judges come to see
each other as multidimensional people with a variety of reasons for
their different views, it is more likely that they will present and consider a greater variety of legal arguments without regard to whether
Edwards, Race and the.Judiciary,supa note 6, at 329.
93 See Wald, supra note 9,at 252 ("The diversity judges bring to the table, like that
of all Americans, is not bipolar.").
92
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the arguments are associated with a "liberal" or "conservative" perspective.
The existence of collegiality on a court, then, greatly affects
whether the judges on that court will be able to capitalize on their diversity. A court that can use the diversity of its members productively
will make better decisions than a court that cannot. I have found that,
as my court became more collegial, the judges came to enjoy what
made them different.
I have thus far been speaking of "diversity" in the sense of differential expertise, experience, and professional background-that is,
diversity that denotes the possession of unique knowledge, information, or perspectives by group members. Demographic diversity on a
court-such as race, sex, age, and socioeconomic and geographic
background, for example-raises different issues. It is more difficult
to explain how the race or sex of judges affects collegiality in judicial
decision making.)" Do these diverse voices make it easier or harder to
attain and maintain a collegial environment?
Research on demographic diversity in organizations suggests that
increased diversity of race, ethnicity, and gender can have negative effects on group functioning because it leads to increased stereotyping
and makes communication more difficult and conflict more likely."
But, as noted earlier, diversity research also shows that diverse groups
have access to diverse information, which may enhance group processes.
My own experience suggests that demographic diversity enhances
collegiality. The studies that suggest otherwise are not focused on judicial settings, where judges are equal in status, pay, authority, and position. Most judges on the federal bench are very smart and accomplished, so they are not vying for recognition on these terms. Indeed,
we appreciate and admire unique feats of scholarship among our colleagues, because it aids us in our work and brings respect and prestige
to the court. I see no reason why race, sex, or ethnic diversity should
be disruptive in this context, and I have not experienced it as a disruptive force on my court. If anything, demographic diversity lends to the

94 Cf Heather Elliott, The Difference Women judges Make: Stare Decisis,
Norms of Collegiality, and "FeminineJurisprudence": A Research Proposal, 16 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 41, 47
(2001) (hypothesizing that "[flemale judges may respond more strongly to the doctrines of restraint" and be more drawn to consensus and collegiality).
95 See Williams & O'Reilly, supra note 87, at 104-14 (presenting
research that demonstrates the negative effect of demographic diversity on group functioning).
9 Id. at 86-87.

1670

UNIVERSITY OF IENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 151:1639

richness of deliberation among members of a court.'7 In my experience, increased demographic diversity often fosters the informational
diversity that promotes improved appellate decision making.
I believe that a collegial court becomes greater than the sum of its
diverse parts and that demographic diversity can promote, not impede, collegiality. Why? Judges are whole people who have multiple
identities and experiences. But judges also serve as equals who are
obliged to enforce the law no matter their distinctive perspectives. "A
more diverse judiciary... reminds judges that all perspectives inescapably admit of partiality. With this understanding, judges are less
likely to fall prey to the temptations that trouble scholars and menbers of the public who believe that judicial decision making is mostly a
product of personal ideology." 8
THE NECESSITY OF LEADERSHIP

Professor Lynn Stout has examined social science literature in her
attempt to explain whyjudges generally decide cases according to law,
even though they have no external economic incentives to do so.!"
She notes that social scientists have determined that several factors
lead people to cooperate, rather than betray one another or "defect,"
in experiments. These factors may be relevant to theorizing about the
conditions under which judges will act collegially. First, Professor
Stout notes that people tend to follow the suggestions of their leadership.'. This finding resonates with my experience as Chief Judge of
my court from 1994 to 2001.
When I took over as ChiefJudge of the D.C. Circuit, I was determined to promote collegiality as I have described it. And I was forthright in stating my intentions. Of course, my intentions and my colleagues' willingness to subscribe to my views were two different
things-the former did not guarantee the latter. So I decided to lead
by deed, following a very simple formula. First, I made it clear that
"ideology" would have no effect whatsoever on my work as the administrative and managerial head of the court. Rather, my mission was to
97

See Edwards, Race and theJudiciay,s.r/a note 6, at 329 ("[R]acial diversity on the

bench can enhance judicial decision making by broadening the variety of voices and
perspectives in the deliberation process.").
h. at 329-30.
9t) Set, Stout, stprna nole 44 (examining the "common and predictable" nature
of
altruism formulated by social science research as the motivating force behind judicial
behavior).
Hit
I. at 1615.
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serve everyone on the court equally. I was not the "liberal Chief
Judge"; I was the "Chief Judge." And I worked very hard in every aspect of judicial administration and management to make the D.C.
Circuit as good an operation as was possible. As the court managers
and I began to fulfill our goals, we saw a positive energy develop in the
court. We also garnered the trust of the judges and staff. The more
that we did right, the more we inspired others to think of the work of
the court as a "common enterprise." The court's reputation then became a matter of personal pride to everyone within the operation.
This effect mirrors a second factor noted by Professor Stout. She
reports that studies have found that experimental subjects cooperate
in social dilemmas when "the players share a sense of social identity
(that is,a sense of membership in a common group)."'
As Chief
Judge, I tried to instill this sense of membership in a common enterprise by increasing pride in the institution of the court itself.
On judicial matters, I made it clear to everyone that I was merely
the "first among equals"-meaning that I would preside at hearings,
but my voice in decision making carried no greater voice than any
other judge's voice. Although in technical terms that was obviously
true, I thought it was important to emphasize it, since I am no shrinking violet. I did not moderate my voice strategically; I just made sure
my colleagues knew I did not believe that being Chief Judge gave my
views any special weight.
I encouraged divergent voices on controversial operational issues.
For example, individual judges were allowed to append separate
statements to the court's Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias Task Force Report."2' This diffused a great deal of anger that had built up over certain aspects of the report. And when Congress sought the views of the
court on whether we needed additional judges, Judge Silberman testified with me at a congressional hearing before Senator Grassley.
Judge Silberman took the position that the court did not need another judge, "')' while I testified that we did.'' Judge Silberman and I
Id.
D.C. CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDIER, RIACE & ETHNIC BIAS, TIHE GENDER,
RACE, AND ETINIC BIAS TASK FORCE PRQECI"IN Ti IIED.C. CIRCUIT (1995)

author).

103 Conseri'ng/i]dicialIesources: The Caseload f the U.S. Court

(on file with
tAhpeal.o/oi
he Disitrict

of Columbia Circuit and the Appropit4ae Allocation ouugeships: Heciriuugs Before the S'ubcouim.
o0 Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the /]udicimy, 104th Cong. 25-27
(1995) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit).
Ic. at 7-10 (statement of Hally T. Edwards, Chief Judge, U.S. Court
of Appeals
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told each other in advance what we were going to say and sent each
other our remarks before we went to the Hill. In fact, he asked me
for, and I provided, factual information that he used to support his
point. In my view, this is the way the court is supposed to operate.
There was no "right" or "wrong" position on the number of judges
that we needed. So if Judge Silberman and other judges felt strongly
that no more judges were needed, it was better for us to know each
other's views in advance, so we could share our thinking openly and
respectfully. Interestingly, but of no surprise to me, Judge Silberman's position on the need for more judges remained the same even
after the election of President Bush, as did my own view.
Such experiences engendered a critical sense of trust among the
judges. This trust carries over into our discussions about cases. We
trust one another to present legitimate legal arguments and not to
work to advance an ideological agenda. This element of trust has also
been documented by social scientists. Studies have shown that experimental subjects are more likely to cooperate when they believe
that their fellow subjects are likely to cooperate. 115 Similarly, when I
demonstrated to judges on my court that they could trust me not to
use administrative power for partisan or controversial ends, they responded in kind.
I also tried very hard to bring my colleagues together outside of
our roles as judges. I remembered their birthdays and sent them
small gifts. (The first time I did this, one colleague was so shocked
that he called to ask me why I had sent him a gift on his birthday.) I
arranged for private luncheons for the judges, to which we invited notable public figures from other fields-like General Colin Powell (before he became Secretary of State), Washington Redskins owner Daniel Snyder, Washington Wizards owner Abe Pollin, chef Roberto
Donna of Galileo Restaurant, news commentator David Brinkley, and
National Gallery of Art Director Earl Powell, to name a few. And,
each term, we had a festive private dinner with our spouses or mates,
during which we shared raucous tales about one another and laughed
about the trying moments of the year that hadjust ended.
The effect of such interactions is also documented by social scientists. Not surprisingly, studies have shown that allowing experimental
subjects to communicate with each other increases their cooperative

for the D.C. CircUfit).
15 Stout, supra note
44, at 1616.
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behavior in social game situations. " "; This is true "even when the [subjects] are not allowed to discuss the game itself."' Similarly, it is not
surprising that judges behave more collegially on the bench when
they have opportunities to interact outside of the courtroom and the
conference room.
There is not much doubt in my mind that a court must have a
leader who values collegiality and who takes steps to nurture it in order to bring about a more collegial court."' It is more difficult to
know for sure, however, what personal attributes contribute to strong
and effective leadership. Fortunately, it is easy for me to discuss this
issue without any self-serving intention to "congrattlate" members of
my own court, because there are a number of outstanding leaders in
the federal judiciary outside of my own court. An excellent example is
Chief Judge Edward R. Becker on the Third Circuit. When Chief
Judge Becker was nominated for the Devitt Distinguished Service to
Justice Award, his colleagues' letter in support of his nomination was a
testament to his efforts to foster collegiality on his court. "' His colleagues credited him with "the promulgation of a number of innovat[ions] ... [that] had the effect of welding the different courts of
the [Third] Circuit into one collegial body."' "' On awarding the Devitt Award to Chief Judge Becker, the Selection Panel commended his
activities that helped "reinforce collegial ties within the judicial
branch.""' ChiefJudge Becker's leadership strengths are clear: he is
active, visionary, fireless, loyal, decisive, and creative. He aggressively
tries to understand his colleagues' needs, embraces their concerns,
and presses to offer them support. He confronts and addresses prob-

I htId.
at

1615-16.

107 I.
08 Cf. 1,AWRENCE S. WRIGI-ITSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY
RELEVANT? 85-87 (1999) (discussing "ideal qualities" in the leadership of a Chief.Justice: willingness and ability to wvork hard, intellectual capability, sensible assignment of

opinions, running an organized ship, sensitivity to others, development and maintenance of a collegial atmosphere, and spirit of conciliation). For a thoughtful analysis
of leadership in the allocation of work on the circuit courts, see HOVARD, sn/no note
63, at 222-58.
109See Letter from The Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Individually and on
Behalf of
the Unaninots Members of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, to the Devitt Selection
Panel, Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award (Nov. 9, 2001) (on file with
attthor) (detailing Chief Judge Becker's many achievements on the bench that make
him a worthy recipient of the Devitt Award).
Id. at 4.

Press Release, American JudicatUre Society, Edward R. Iecker Chosen as Recipient of 20th Annual Devitt Award (May 2002) (on file with author).
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lems directly and deals with people honestly. He is earnest, almost to
a fault, but he is never faulted for his earnestness. He knows everything about his operation and everyone in the operation, both judges
and staff. He combines enormous energy with commitment and intelligence. Most important, his leadership is selfless, always focused on
the enterprise, never on himself. When he receives a suggestion for
how the operation could run better, he embraces the concept, goes
directly to his colleagues, talks, listens, and pursues the idea with energy.
Described by a commentator as a 'judge in full," Chief Judge
Becker exemplifies the "aspirations for institutional architecture and
arrangements that are both efficient and humane.""2 He epitomizes
the ideal of a good and effective leader and gives credence to the view
that "the modern judiciary rests on the expectation that judges will
behave in an altruistic fashion." 3"
A

BRIEF NOTE ON OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING COLI.EGIALITy

It is worth noting that, apart from the matters that I have already
discussed, there are several other factors that may affectjudicial collegiality. One such factor is the size of a court."' In the face of growing
caseloads,' the question whether to increase the number of judges
raises the question whether collegiality would be undermined by such
an increase. " ; Many judges are convinced that collegiality enables
112 Stephen Burbank, Remarks at the 20th Annual Edward
'J. Devitt Distinguished
Service to Justice Award Ceremony (Sept. 30, 2002) (transcript on file with author).
11 Stout, supra note 44, at 1609 (emphasis omitted).
1.,On collegiality and the expansion of the federal judiciaty, see Frank
M. Coffin,

Grace Under Pressure: A Callfor.ludicial &Help, 50 0-110 ST'.
L.. 399, 401 (1989); Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 10, at 1017-18; Reynolds & Richman, su/pra note 86, at 563; William 1L.Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1296 (1996); William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record.fnr
More Iederalj/d4ge.ships, 1 J. A1,. PRAC. & PROCESS 37, 45-46 (1999) [hereinafter Richman, An Aigouent]; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 323-25; Symposium, The
Future ofthe Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 270, 284 (1996); Carl Tobias, The New
Certiorari and a National Study o] the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNEL L. RiV. 1264, 1275
(1996); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 1173. On collegiality and the question of splitting
the Ninth Circuit, see Procter Hug, Ir. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Ap/nroachfor the Ninth
Circuit, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (2000); Robert C. Mueller, Findinga System of Courts
that Work, 45 FE1). LAW. 2, 3 (1998); O'Scannlain, suplra note 10, at 315-16; Jennifer E.
Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A F'onmer Clerks View of the Proposed Niutth Circuit Split, 73
WASH. L. REV. 875, 912-13 (1998); Symposium, supra, at 285, 320-21.
lit See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHAI.ENGE AND REFORM
60-64

(1996) (detailing increases in case filings and caseloads in the federal courts).
116See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Nith Circuit,
50 SMU L.
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better decisions, and that smaller courts tend to be more collegial. I
agree. The appointment of more judges to handle growing caseloads
does not come without substantial costs." 7 Chief Judge Wilkinson of
the Fourth Circuit has argued that
one engages in more fruitful interchanges with colleagues whom one
deals with day after clay than with judges who are simply faces in the
crowd ....
Smaller courts by and large encourage more substantial investments in relationships and in the reciprocal respect fobr differing
views that lie at the heart of what appellate justice is abotIt.

It stands to reason that the larger the court, the less frequently any
two judges sit together and interact with each other."' I have always
believed that it is easier to achieve collegiality on a court with twelve
members than on one with twenty or thirty. It is easier for judges to
keep tip and become familiar with each other. Smaller groups have
the potential to interact more efficiently, making close and continual
collaboration more likely.12
Having the entire circuit's chambers in the same building, as with
the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit, can also be immensely helpful.'2 ' The ease of face-to-face interactions outside the context of hearings and conferences makes a difference, especially for a Chief Judge
who is trying hard to hear, understand, and address the needs of her
or his colleagues.

REV. 583, 597 (1997) (noting the "somewhat greater collegiality of a smaller court").
But see Richman, An Argument, supra note 114, at 45 (suggesting that collegiality is not a
ftinction of size).
117 See Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy"
of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOwA L.
REV. 871, 918-19 (1983) (arguing that increasing the number of federal judgeships will
make it more difficult to lure qualifiedjudges and will negatively impact "the manageahilit and the collegiality of the ciictuits").
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 1173-74.
11 See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 10, at 1018 ("As the size of a court
grows, and
the probability of depending again Upon the concurrence of a particular judge declines, the coin of the reahn is devalued.").
12 There are a number of my respected colleagues on the federal bench, especially on the Ninth Circuit, who would disagree with this assessment, for they do not
view collegiality as a function of the size of the court.
121 See A. Leo Levin, Lessons for Smaller Circuits, Caution for Larger Ones, in
RESTRUCTURINGJusrIcE:

THE INNOVATIONS OF THiE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE

OF THE FEID)RAt CouRTs 331, 335-36 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (discussing the
costs of dispersion to collegiality); Tacha, The Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 19 (worrying about collegial relationships among appellate judges who are distanced geog,-aphically).
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The potential adverse effects of a large or geographically spread
out court can be mitigated somewhat by advanced systems of electronic communications. A major development that contributed to a
rise in collegiality in the D.C. Circuit was our push into the world of
technology. All of the judges, law clerks, secretaries, managers, and
staff are bound together by ouradvances in automation. We routinely
exchange messages via e-mail. We use the Internet and an intranet,
on which every rule, procedure, event, committee, sitting schedule,
opinion, etc. is posted. We have an application called "Team Talk"
(soon to be "Web Vote"), which allows judges to vote electronically on
the more than 1000 motions we receive each term (and on a host of
other matters as well). We also use an instant-messaging system within
the courthouse. This program allows the judges to talk to each other
and to law clerks electronically during oral argument. We can access
the Internet during oral argument if we need to look up a case. And
judges can continue to work when they are away from the courthouse,
by use of handheld communication devices and by remote access to
the court's computer network.
All of these developments have been good for collegial relations
and collaboration among the judges.2 2 In addition to making the
place run more efficiently, which is a good in itself, moving the court
into the world of technology has enhanced our personal interactions
and the efficacy of our deliberations. We now have more total communications overall because of e-mail. We can easily keep abreast of
the development of colleagues' thinking on cases, and there are more
opportunities for discussion. Finer points and details that occur to us
on reflection do not have to wait for a face-to-face meeting, since now
we can write brief e-mails noting our concerns and receive quick responses. The quality of our deliberations has been enhanced by technology because it allows us to "talk" more frequently and more efficiently. Fewer matters fall through the cracks, resulting in fewer
misunderstandings that can provoke problems.
Law clerks can also contribute, both positively and negatively, to
collegiality among judges. By being privy to some of the exchanges

122

See Circuit Chief How the Court Really Works, LEGALTIMIS.COM (Oct. 27, 1999),

.pdf
available at http://www.cadc.uscoorts.gov/coimion/snite/chambers/hte/legahl
(discussing the benefits of technological advances forjudges); cf Hen)' H. Perritt, .r.
& Ronald H. Staodt, 'he 1% Solution: American fudges Mast Enter the Internet Age, 2,1.
APP. PRAC. & PROlcrSS 463, 469 (2000) (discussing judicial collaboration and the use of
the Internet). But c/. Murphy, suna note 10, at 455 (probing the "tension between
technology and collegiality").
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between judges, especially in the context of reading and criticizing
each other's opinions, law clerks can assistjudges to understand better
their colleagues and help them find ways to reach common ground
and communicate their ideas effectively. But if a court is ideologically
divided, law clerks who come to the job with highly politicized views of
the law can exacerbate that polarization in their conversations among
themselves. 2 3 Judges can also become too comfortable in the hierarchical fiefdoms of their chambers, with law clerks and staff who can
sometimes, quite unconsciously, promote judicial insularity.'12 At bottom, however, law clerks follow the lead of their judges. If a court is
unduly politicized or its judges too insular, it is because of an absence
of collegiality among thejudges and is not the fault of law clerks.
And then there is the wild card of individual personalities. I often
wonder how much the change in collegiality that took place on my
court was a result of the personalities of thejudges then and now. It is
well known that the D.C. Circuit of the uncollegial days had on it
some judges with very intense personalities and strong views.'2, 5 But
the personalities on the court today are far from meek, so I do not
know what to think of this consideration. Perhaps there were simply
ill-starred combinations in days past. One judge alone probably cannot destroy collegiality on a court, because of the various ways in
which the group can successfully bring him or her into the fold of institutional norms. But a few uncompromising personalities, together,
can distract a court from its mission.
Finally, the effect of public scrutiny cannot be ignored. The ideologically driven image of courts resurfaces whenever judicial nominees' political views are scrutinized in the public eye. In my earlier
years on the bench, I witnessed occasions when ideology took over

123

See Edwards, The JudicialFunction, supra note 6, at 855 (noting that "it is not un-

usual these (lays to find instances of excess zeal among law clerks-conservatives and
liberals alike-in support of preferred ideological positions");J. Daniel Mahoney, Law
Clerks: For Better orfor Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 338 n.70 (1988) (YVoung, headstrong clerks are less likely than theirjudges to be willing to compromise....").
124 See COHEN, supra note 10, at 13 (arguing that "[a]s judicial
staffs grow, judges
will become insulated from their colleagues"); .f.Edwards, supra note 12, at 407
("Speaking almost exclusively to receptive (and frequently captive) audiences, [a
judge] is likely to acquire a complacent confidence in the accuracy of his view of
thin s.").
,SeeJeffrey
Rosen, Obstruction ofludges, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. I1,2002, at
38, 41 ("[T]he liberal and conservative judges were at one another's throaLs. On the
left and on the right, a few of the judges had strong ideological agendas and aggressive
personalities, and this combination led them to light constantly over internecine issties.").
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and effectively destroyed collegiality, because the confirmation process "promoted" ideological commitment. In other words, if an appointee joins the court feeling committed to the political party that
ensured the appointment, the judge's instinct may be to vote in a
block with other perceived conservatives or liberals. Even worse, a
judge who has been put through an ideologically driven confirmation
ordeal may take the bench feeling animosity toward the party that attempted to torpedo the appointment on ideological grounds. One
commentator recently argued that, "[b]y subjecting lower-court
nominees to brutalizing confirmation hearings in the Supreme Court
style, the Senate" may contribute to producing ajudge who is
so scarred and embittered by his confirmation ordeal that he becomes
radicalized on the bench, castigating his opponents and rewarding his
In short, by exaggerating the stakes in the lower-court
supporters.
nomination battles, interest groups on both sides may be encouraging
worst fears.12
the appointment of judges who will fulfill their

Focusing on the ideology of the nominee can be detrimental to
collegiality if this promotes a self-fuI filling prophecy.
The more that judges are assessed in terms of "political" (resultoriented) decisionmaking, the more likely it is that this will become a
selfflilfilling prophecy. Even if judges are able to resist the temptation
to conform to the false perception, continued assessments of judicial
performance in political terns will promote a "new reality," for most
people will come to believe that the jidicial function is nothing more
than a political enterprise. No matter how good the intentions of its servants, the judiciary will be sharply devalued and incompetent to fulfill its
role as mediator in a society with loft), btit
7 sometimes conflicting albitions. This would be a horror to behold.1'

The good thing about a court that is blessed with collegiality is
that new judges are able to join the court and find their way easily.

1211
127

Id. at '40.
Edwards, TheJudicial Function, supra note 6, at 838-39. Ken Starr, a former col-

league on the D.C. Circtit, remarks that one hallmark of good judging is the ability to
vote withotit regard to the appointing party:
I was reminded ... of a comment in my early days as an appellate court JUdge
by a more senior judge, Harry Edwards, whom President Carter appointed.
"Ken, you know you're really ajudge when you vote, in conscience, against the
folks who appointed you." That was exactly right. When the judge honestly
votes against the friends who put him on the bench, then the judge is reaching the goal of being genuinely disinterested and dispassionate-as a truly
honorable judge should be.
KENNETII W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: TitE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LiFE
52-53 (2002).
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Getting the law right is the mission of a truly collegial court. New
members of a collegial court quickly surmise that they have no good
incentive to pursue individual ideological goals. And a single new
judge has no real standing or authority to undo the norms of collegiality. In due course, newjudges on a truly collegial court come to appreciate thatjudges all have a common interest, as members of the institution of the judiciary, in getting the law right, and that, as a result,
we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. 128
JUDGES' VIEWS ON COLLEGIAuITY

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that collegiality affectsjudicial decision making in significant ways. It is also clear that judges
are the instruments of collegiality. It is less clear, however, what
judges think about collegiality. It is also hard to determine whether
and how judges invoke collegiality as a principle in the course of their
judicial duties. Interestingly, in addition to judges' writings on the
subject,21 it turns out that there are a number of instances in which
judges have relied on "collegiality" in support of judicial opinions.
These judicial opinions give some clues as to how judges think about
collegiality.
I was surprised to find that I had invoked the principle of collegiality in 1987, in a concurring opinion in Bartlett v. Bowen.' t: My purpose was to express my opposition to a petition for rehearing en banc
and respond to a dissenting colleague's views in favor of en banc review. I wrote that the "clearly wrong" or "highly dubious" test urged
by the dissent to determine when to rehear a case en banc was "a selfserving and result-oriented criterion"' ,' that was doing
substantial violence to the collegiality that is indispensable to judicial decisionmaking. Collegiality cannot exist if every dissenting judge feels
obliged to lobby his or her colleagues to rehear the case en banc in order to vindicate that judge's position.
Politicking will replace the
thoughtful dialogue that should characterize a court where every judge

See supra text accompanying notes 20-21 (describing collegiality
as a process
that allows all viewpoints to be considered to ensure that the law is interpreted cor-

rectlK2).
See supra note 10 (providing a sample ofjudges' writings on collegiality).
.0 824 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring).
In Bartlelt,
the D.C. Circuit, having decided to grant an en banc rehearing, reconsidered its decision and denied rehearing. Id. at 1240,
131 Id. at 1242.
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respects the integrity of his or her colleagues. Furthermore, such a process would impugn the integrity of panel judges, who are both intelligent
enough to know
the law and conscientious enough to abide by their oath
12
3
to uphold it.

My concurring statement in Bartlett v. Bowen is the only time that I
have actually discussed collegiality in an opinion, which is ironic in
light of the fact that I did so at a time when collegiality as I know it today did not exist on the D.C. Circuit-but that much may be obvious
from my pointed remarks in Bartlett. That opinion is a testament to
my desire for a collegial court at a moment when the D.C. Circuit was
very much in the grip of ideological division. In an uncollegial environment at its worst, decisions to rehear cases en banc can result in
disastrous judicial decision making-ideologically driven and resultoriented. A high rate of rehearing cases en banc can be a symptom of
an absence of collegiality. And, as my colleague ChiefJudge Ginsburg
has noted, it can also pose a threat to collegiality. "v It can both reflect
and feed a court's lack of confidence in the work of panels.'" However, the complete absence of en banc review may also be detrimental
to collegiality, because panels may become too independent of the
rest of the court.'' 5 On a collegial court, the court trusts panels to do
their work, and the possibility of en banc rehearings constrains panels
to be responsible to the full court.
I am not the only judge who has invoked collegiality in a judicial
opinion. There have been numerous instances in the various circuits
in which collegiality explicitly informed legal reasoning in an opinion.
For example,judges have cited collegiality in support of adherence to
circuit precedent and the principle of stare decisis." Judges have as.32Id. at 1243-44 (emphasis in original).
133See Ginsburg & Falk, supira note 10, at 1021 (arguing
that too high a rate of re-

hearings en banc makes judicial panels less responsible to the rest of the court because
fi-equent rehearings would weaken the presuLmption of finality associated with panel
decisions).
]3' See id. (noting that frequent rehearings en banc encourage panels to stake
out

adventuresome positions in the knowledge that the reviewing court can always overturn the decision). Chiefjudge Ginsburg partially attibutes the decrease during the
past decade in the number of cases reheard en banc in the D.C. Circuit to the judges
becoming more "collegial, in the sense that the judges, notwithstanding their different
views, had more confidence in each other's good faith and competence, and so deferred more to judgments of panels on which they did not sit." Ginsbtirg & Boynton,
supra note 10, at 260.
135 Ginsburg & Falk, sup)ra note 10, at 1021.
See, e.g., United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2001) (DeMoss,

J.,

concurring) ("[O]Ur rIle of orderliness and considerations of collegiality within the

Coturt require our adherence to the Circtit precedents...."); Harter v. Vernon, 101
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sociated collegiality with a court's custom and practice.' 7 Judges have
used collegiality to explain why, in the interest of speaking with collective authority, the court should decline to reach matters on which
there is disagreement not essential to the result. 11 Judges have expressed reluctance to decide certain matters in the absence of collegial deliberation." ' Judges have used collegiality as a justification for

F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttigj., dissenting) (stating that, were one panel able
to overturn a previous panel "unconstrained by any sense of obligation to the principles of stare decisis, our own internal rules, or notions of collegiality," such a panel
"couIld rutn roughshod over prior precedent, effectively repealing a rule whose importance to both the Rile of law and to the orderly operation of a cotrt is beyond dispute'); Fine v. Bellefonte Underxvriters hIs. Co., 758 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1985) (Cardamone, J.) (noting that reversing a previous panel in an attempt to remedy a
perceived error would "throw a wrench into the collegial workings of our Court that
are essential to its instittitional integrity"); :/. Nat'l Patent Dev. Corp. v. TJ. Smith &
865 F.2d 353, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsbirg,.J., concurring) ("I am
Nephew, ltd.,
convinced that the full circuit, having had ample time lot reflection and running no
risk of undermining the court's collegiality, should reverse the course set by Neidhari.").
137For example, one judge proclaimed:
This is a court which has been marked by collegiality and fairness. We work
well together and are all, without exception, protid of this institutiion. We will
all continue in that vein when this case is over. Nevertheless, it is essential to
observe that the refusal to permit a late en bane call was contrary to otAI custom and practice and was indeed aberrational and extraordinary, as is judge
Kozinski's dissent.
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt, J.,concirring).
On a particular Title VII issue,judge
Kleinfeld explained:
[l]t would be better for tIs to avoid deciding whether Title VII applies....
[D]eciding the issue redices the collegiality of our decision. By "collegiality" ... I mean the dictionary definition, "shared authority among colleagues,"
so that we meld otir individual voices into the voice of the court. An appellate
cotirt ought to speak collectively as nearly as possible ....
Ass'n of Mexican-An. Edtcators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 601 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., concturring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). In a different
situationJudge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit stated:
[ln the interest of efficiency and collegiality on this Court, %\herethere are
differing views as to the substantive right, this panel has chosen to withdraw all
of its prior opinion which relates to whether the complaint alleges a constitutional right so that the opinion will serve as no precedent on that issue.
Spiveyv. Elliott, 41 F.3d 1497, 1499 (11 th Cir. 1995).
See United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 1995) (Ripple, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("Itis indeed sad that many of the
judges of the court believe that, on so important an issue, neither argument of cotinsel
at oral argument nor the collegial discussion of the conference room is appropriate to
the decision-making process."); Wells ex tel. Kehne v. Arave, 18 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.
1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The Ninth Circuit en banc court less than foIr
hours later denied a stay without any oral argument and without even assembling or
otherwise discussing the case in a collegial manner. Surely this is no way forjudges to
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following sister circuits.""' And judges have invoked collegiality to
chide their colleagues for permitting disagreements over the law to
take the form of personal attacks.""
While the invocations of collegiality in judicial opinions are varied, a few telling tendencies emerge. First, collegiality seems to be associated with rule of law principles such as following precedent, stare
decisis, and court custom. Second, collegiality is pressed as a constraint on individual judges deciding issues without the benefit of
group deliberation and consensus. Third, collegiality is sometimes
used to chide colleagues who are perceived to be behaving uncollegially, whether it is in behavior that goes against custom, precedent, the
consensus imperative, or professionalism. Clearly, judges perceive collegiality as bolstering institutional and rule of law norms. Perhaps the
danger of being perceived as uncollegial by one's colleagues works to
constrain judges and induces them to behave in ways more in keeping
with institutional and rule of law norms. Institutional thinking is not
merely an individual state of mind that accounts only for individual
judges' motivation; institutionalism can be "enforced" among colleagues by the expectations that one will act in a manner befitting a
judge, respectful of the rule of law and respectful of professional
norms. Collegiality thus appears to function as an umbrella concept
and a catchphrase that captures those norms ofjudging.

perform the single most important duty assigned to them by the Constitution and federal law." (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Salinas-Garza, 811 F.2d 272, 273 (5th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (" [T] he conference provides the opportunity for the members
of the panel to engage in a more thorough discussion of a case in a collegial atmosphere ....
"); Glass v. Blackburn, 767 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (noting that "the remaining issues require additional evaluation and collegial consideration before a ruling can be made"); Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 735
F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring in the dissent)
("[l]t is not necessaty to reach a final judgment without the benefit of oral argument
and collegial effort and I stop short of doing so."); United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41,
48 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Mikvaj., dissenting) ("There was none of the traditional collegiality of the decisional process normal to a multi-member appellate court.").
I
See Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1994) (ChoyJ.)
(referring
to a "collegial context" in the Ninth Circuit's extension of a Third Circuit filing exception for pro se habeas petitioners).
1
See, e.g., Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 184 F.3d
600, 608
(6th Cir. 1999) (Batchelderj., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) ("Our dissenting colleague's own purposes may be furthered by publicly impugning the integrity of his colleagues. Collegiality, cooperation and the court's decision-making process clearly are not.").
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COLLEGIALITY IN FURTHERANCE OFJUDICIAl. AUTHORITY,
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT, PRINCIPLED DECISION MAKING,
AND BETTER DECISIONS

What scholars and other commentators often miss in their assessments of appellate decision making is that shared authority is an essential
component of the judicial function. Thus, even in the worst of times, an
appellate court must function collegially, because the judges must act
work.,41
pursuant to "shared authority" in the performance of their
Although three judges sit together on a panel, they must arrive at
one disposition of a case. Whatever their different perspectives, they
must channel their views into a collective effort. This is not optional.
It is a formal requirement of legal authority. A circuit judge has no
individual authority. His or her authority consists solely in joining a
collegial product. If an appellate judge does not persuade or agree
with at least one other judge, his or her position simply does not become the law. The area of overlap between the positions of panel
members is the common ground that becomes the court's holding.
Legal authority on the circuit courts thus depends on judicial consensus.
Because finding common ground is a condition of legal authority,
judges must invest in building trust and respect among colleagues.
Panel judges cannot easily go their separate ways on their own intel-4
their job.
lectual paths, for they are bound together by the nature of
4
imperative.1
They are quite literally constrained by the consensus
They must find common ground in a case and maintain it, as the ten-

142

This is a very simple concept: "collegiality" means "[s]hared authority among

colleagues." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 291 (2d college ed. 1982). It is
also defined as "collective responsibility shared by each of the colleagues." THE
RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 264 (rev. ed. 1980).
143 Compare Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Powel; 23 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 807, 826-29 (2000) (explaining that collegiality in judging is necessary to
gather a majority and to give the opinion authority whereas, in academia, collegiality
flows friom the decisions of writers who have similar approaches to work together), with
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 10, at 1017 (noting that legal academics work without collaborators or peer review and have less incentive to value the opinions of colleagues
than ajudge, whose legal authority depends on persuading colleagues).
144 See HOWARD, supra note 63, at 189 ("Group decision making... [is] a major
potential limit on the personal discretion of circuit judges."); Fried, supra note 143, at
828-29 (arguing that collegiality's "horizontal, synchronic continuity" acts as a constraint on decisions); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Jiudicial Writings, 62 U. Ciii. L. REV. 1371, 1377 (1995) (noting that "consensus is a formidable constraint on what an opinion writer says and how she says it").
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tative agreements reached in conference are translated into the written word.
Justice Cardozo may have been wrong in suggesting that "attrition" is the reason why "diverse minds" come together to produce
"truth and order" in decision making.'4 5 He was right, however, in his
implicit suggestion that, over time and over the experience of repeatedly working together, judges become more mature and balanced as
they internalize the need for group consensus. They can become
temperamentally more flexible, open to persuasion, and less entrenched. They also learn to remain mindful of the partiality of all
perspectives." '"; In other words, judges, like other professionals, evolve
in their thinking," 7 and we are aided by the wisdom and insights given
to us by our seniors, as well as by our time on the bench. After having
seen my court evolve over the years, I see collegiality's moderating effect, not only on the decisions of panels, but on thejudges themselves,
so that as ajudge becomes more experienced, he or she develops habits of mind that reflect the constraints of collegiality.' ,
It is my explicit contention that the quality of judges' decisions
improves when collegiality filters their decision making. I think there
are several qualitative measures suggesting that collegiality enables
courts to reach better decisions. First, if, as I argue, collegiality has
the effect of removing the determinism of politics and ideology, then
collegial decisions are necessarily better in terms of the rule of law.
Such decisions are less likely to admit of judges' personal ideological
preferences. Judges are more likely to focus only on matters that
properly should affect decision making, such as positive law, precedent, the record in a case, and the parties' arguments. Second, since
collegiality enables smart people to lend fully what they have to offer
to the process of deliberation, judicial decisions made in a collegial
environment invariably will benefit from the full range of expertise,
experience, intellectual ability, and differing perspectives that exist on
a court. The deliberative process is richer and fuller because of collegiality, so the decisions are the product of more rigorous, challenging,
and thorough discussion. Third, since collegiality fosters better delib-

145 CARDOZO, s/pra note 1, at 176-77.

1-16
See Edwards, Race and theJudiciaty, supra note 6, at 329-30 (finding
that "all per-

spectives inescapably admit of partiality").
147 On the development of my thought, see Brian C. Murchison, Law, Belief and
Bildi
dtg: The Edtcation.of Hany Edwards, 29 HOFsrRA L. REV. 127 (2000).
See Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1358 (arguing that
collegiality has a
moderating effect on judges' v'oting behavior).
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erations, collegial judges are more likely to find the right answer in
any given case. Most cases heard in the courts of appeals, both "easy"
19
and "hard," admit of a best answer if judges do their work correctly.'
It is only in a very small percentage of appeals, involving "very hard"
cases, that no "right" answer can be found.'' Collegiality prevents
judges from going astray in "hard" cases and facilitates the process of
finding right answers.
In short, in a collegial environment, both judges and their decisions become more "objective." I do not mean objectivity in its most
literal sense, but, rather, as the term is employed in the physical sciences. Sharon Traweek, in her anthropological study of physicists,
notes that even in the realm of science, "[p]ure objectivity is tacitly
recognized as impossible; but error can be estimated and minimized.
The means is peer review, or collective surveillance; the final degree
of order comes from human institutions.'" ' The same is true with
judges.

149

See Edwards, su5pra note 12, at 389-403 (categorizing cases as "easy," "hard,"
or

"very hard," and describing how judges go about deciding cases).

One must also not forget that there is a significant fail-safe in connection with

cases involving judicial interpretations of contested statutory provisions: Congress can

repeal or revise the disputed pIrovision if it disagrees with the court's construction.
See, for example, Spenrer v. NVLR3, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (EdwardsJ.), which
was superceded by statute.

Congressional action is not necessarily a measure of

whether a coirt's decision is "right" or "wrong." But it does at least ensure that, in
those cases in which congressional intent is what is ultimately at issue (which is most of

the case fare before the courts of appeals), Congress can reclaim the last word by revising the statute. In some "hard" cases, and in most "vermy hard" cases, collegiality cannot
guarantee a "right" answer, because none may exist. But collegiality will produce a
thoughtItl opinion that will allow Congress to reflect further on its intentions. In-

deed, the D.C. Circuit has a procedure whereby Congress is given notice of decisions
involving questionable statutory provisions that might usefully be amended. See generally Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Coinmunicalion Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 GEO. L.J. 2189 (1997) (describing
the development and operation of the system of notification between the D.C. Circuit
and Congress).
151 SHARON TRAWEEK, BEAMTIMES AND LIFETIMES:
THE WORLD OF HIGH ENERGY
PHYsicisTs 125 (1988); see also Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical
Research, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 141, 144 (1987) (assuming that progress in medicine
relies on consensus, and stating that individual clinical judgments, even when based on
evidence, lack a privileged status).

1686

UNIV7?SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151:1639

The study of consensus in science provides something of an analogue to collegial judging. "2 Sociologists, 3 anthropologists,15 philosophers,'"" and historians'5 have studied the formation of consensus
among scientists, and their research is illuminating. While their findings are of course various, one leading school of sociology has posited
that scientific "truth" is built out of the interactions and negotiations
among scientists in specific institutional and work settings, such as
laboratories. 157

15

SeeJOHN ZIMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE STUDIES:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL

SCIENCE AND TECIINOLOGY 138-39 (1984) ("The modern phenomenon of teamt research ... involves direct collabo ration between scientists of relatively equal standing ....
[T]he extreme individualism embodied in the academic
ethos, and the norms associated with it, is no longer consistent with the realities of scientific life, where collective action is now the rule.");JOHN ZIMAN, PROMETHEUS BOUND,
SCIENCE IN A DYNAMIC STEADY STIE 60-61 (1994) (explaining that "[t]he advance of
knowledge has come to depend on the active collaboration of scientists with specialized skills drawn from a ntumber of distinct research areas or traditions," and that
"[t]he most natural way of exploiting these linkages is to put the research in the hands
of a closely interacting group of people, each of whom can look at it from a different
point of View and contrihute his or her partictular expertise to the common pool of effort").
153 For discussions of the group structuie and dynamics of collaborative scientific
communlities, such as laboratories, and their impact on work product, see STEPHIEN
COLE, MAKING SCIENCE.: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIE[V (1992); ROBERTI N. GIERE,
EXPLAINING SCIENCE: A COGNITIVE APPROACH (1988); KARIN D. KNORR-CETINA, THE
MANUFACTURl. OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON TIE CONSTRUGIIVIST AND CONTEXTUAL
NAIURE OF SCIENCE (1981); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORAIORY LIFE:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FA(:s (Princeton Univ. Press 1986) (1979); BRUNO
l.ATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: How To FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS TIIROUGH
SOCIE'IY (1987).
154 See, e.g., TRAWIEK, su)ra note 151, at 120-25 (discussing the collaborative
ways
in which physicists often work).
1er,See, e.g., PI LP KITC IER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT
AND SoCIAL ASPEcrs O

LEGEND, OIBJECI'IVI'IY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 382-87 (1993) (evaluating the "considerations (that] affect the costs and benefits of consensus-forming mechanisms" within the
scientific commtnity); LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM:
SOME KEY
CONTROVERSIES IN THE PHIIOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1990) (constructing a philosophical
debate of science and scientific research among different schools of philosophical
thought); KEITI LEIRER & CARl WAGNER, RAIONAL CONSENSUS IN SCIENCE AND
SOCIE'IY: A PHILOSOPHICAL. AND MATHEMATICAL STUDY (1981) (articulating a theory
of rational consensus in science and society).
I" E.g., PETER GAl ISON, HOW EXPERIMENTS END (1987); PETER GALISON, IMAGE
AND LOGIC: A MATERIAL CULTURE oF MICROPIIYSICS (1997).
157 See, e.g.,'KNORR-CETINA, supro note 153, at 4 (setting forth the
idea that scientists engage in the "instrumental moanqu/cture of knowledge" in the laboratory); LATlOUR
& WOOLGAR, supra note 153, at 48-49 (depicting the laboratory as a situs of communication and creativity); LATOUR, supra note 153, at 64-80 (describing the laboratory as
an incubator for theory and counterlheory in an ultimate quest for truth).
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Probably the most interesting research is found in the work of
Bruno Latour, the prominent sociologist of science. Latour, who is
well known for his emphasis on the role of social interaction and social construction in the production of scientific "truth,"'r' has in recent years turned his attention to French administrative law. The
Conseil d'Etat, which is the supreme judicial administrative law body
in France, granted Latour unprecedented access to its deliberations
on a series of complex administrative law matters over the course of
several years.' 5" This was remarkable in itself, because the Conseil has
a long tradition of secrecy just as entrenched as our tradition of confidentiality in judicial deliberations. ";" More impressive, however, is
what Latour found. In a recently published book, Latour argues that
the most salient feature of French administrative law and judicial review is the process whereby factually complex, politically charged disputes are refined into abstract questions of administrative law that are
removed from the realm of politics.'
The result, he suggests, is a
form of objectivity in legal interpretation, as the abstraction away from
the facts enables judges to focus on getting the law right in a quasiobjective process of trying to specify rights through legal means.
Of course the French administrative law system is different from
our own in innumerable ways, but it has some important points of
similarity. The conseillers have undergone a more uniform training
than have our judges, since they were all educated at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration."12 Nonetheless, they have a range of experiences, from active roles in administration, to the private sector, the
bar, and administrative judging.'' The Conseil is, by Latour's account, an extraordinarily collegial body in which loyalty to the institution is profound and respect for others' opinions in discussion is a
cherished norm."" There is therefore a potentially useful analogy between the collegiality of the Conseil, in its focus on questions of law,
and the operation of our appellate courts. It is almost deliciously

159

See generally LATOUR & WOOlGAR, s4nra noie 153, at 29 (analyzing "the craft

character of scientific activity through ... observations of scientific practice"); ItNrOUR,
suna note 153, at 173-76 (explaining Latour's theory of scientific tr1uth reached
through social interaction).
159 BRUNO ILVIOUR, L.A FABRIQU" DU DROIT:
UNE EITINOGRAII'IIIE DU CONSEIL
W'ETAT 7-8 (2002).
ht1.
161 Id. at 154-55.
162 Id. at
124.
Id. at 124-26.
164 Id. at 139-2(06.
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ironic that Latour, who is noted for his extreme skepticism of "objectivity" in science, and who made familiar the role of social consensus
in producing scientific truth,''65 has observed such remarkable "objectivity" in the deliberations among the conseillers of the Conseil d'Etat.
I have to admit that I am surprised that the Conseil was willing to
open its doors to Latour. Access tojudicial deliberation in our system
would implicate serious ethical and confidentiality issues.
Latour
changed names and facts, and agreed to allow his manuscript to be
reviewed by the Conseil before publication. " ; But it is possible that a
sleuth would be able to reconnect Latour's account to actual cases,
and possibly to specific conseillers. I am not calling for any such study
in our appellate courts, and indeed I would be opposed to such study,
because of the potential violation of legal and ethical canons.'
Even
our law clerks are not privy to deliberations in conference. I believe
that the mere presence of a "neutral," even silent, observing anthropologist or sociologist in our deliberations would change the character and course of the deliberations among judges."' "
This leads me to acknowledge that the ability of scholars to study
the qualitative aspects ofjudging on a collegial court may have some
significant limits. If scholars cannot directly access the deliberations
that would generate qualitative data, how successful can their studies

165See supna note 158 (fotcusing on Latour's view of scientific truIth
as the product
of scientists' deliberations).
I I'ATOUR, supra note 159,
at 7-8.
167 The court's decision in United States v. Microsofi op., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir.
2001) (en banc) (per curaia), is instrtctivc. In Microsqf, the D.C. Circuit confronted
a situation in which a district court judge had made ex parte statements to reporters
from The New Yorker and other publications while the case was pending before him. Id.
at 108. The court found that the judge had breached his ethical duty each time he
spoke to a reporter about the merits of the case, even thottgh his statements were to be
kept secret and not published tuntil the final judgment isstIed.
at 112. The decision
noted the dialogic natttre of interviews between judge and reporter, and the resttlting
difficulty of knowing whether the personal views of reporters had found their way into
the judge's thinking on the case during the interviews. Id. at 113. And even if secrecy
is demanded and agreed to, there is no way for jtdges to police the select few who are
granted access from trading on the basis of the inside infor)lmation. /d. at 113-14. Just
as serious is the appearance of impropriety and the risk of jeopardizing public confidence in the integrity of the federal courts. Id. at 114. Opening up our collegial Ieliberations to a sociologist or anthropologist would likely raise similar ethical problems, even if the researcher would not be engaged in conversation with tIs but only
observing silently.
(. LaUra Nader, U1 the A'thropologis-PerpeesGained frvn Studying up, in
REINVENT;NG ANTHROPOt.OGY 284, 301-08 (Dell Hymes ed., 1969) (discussing the
problems of althropologists in gaining access to institutions of the powerful, as opposed to the poor and powerless cultures typically studied).
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be? Scholars can interview judges about their experience of collegial
deliberation and work with judges' own written observations of the
process." ' But, obviously, this is not a foolproof method of research.
Scholars are thus unfortunately limited in the qualitative data they can
gather, and there may be no direct, immediate way to study fully the
effects of collegiality on judging. Perhaps this recognition of the
structural and ethical impediments to data gathering might lead
scholars to acknowledge the limits of empirical analysis of adjudication and to adopt an appropriately modest stance regarding their
claims about howjudging works.
CONCLUSION

The D.C. Circuit has changed dramatically in the years that I have
been on the bench. In that time, it has gone from an ideologically divided court to a collegial one in which the personal politics of the
judges do not play a significant role in decision making. In reflecting
on this over the years, I have come to understand that there are a
number of factors that may affect appellate decision making, some
that should and some that should not. Among these factors are the
requirements of positive law, precedent, how a case is argued by the
litigants, the effects of the confirmation process, the ideological views
of the judges, leadership, diversity on the bench, whether a court has
a core group of smart, well-seasoned judges, whether the judges have
worked together for a good period of time, and internal court rules.
My contention is that decision making is substantially enhanced if
these factors are "filtered" by collegiality. There are cross-fertilizing
effects between collegiality and certain of these factors (such as internal court rules, leadership, and diversity), so that the factors both
promote collegiality and enhance decision making when they are filtered by collegiality. In the end, collegiality mitigates judges' ideological preferences and enables us to find common ground and reach
better decisions. In other words, the more collegial the court, the
more likely it is that the cases that come before it will be determined
on their legal merits.
I have by no means attempted a final and definitive account of
collegiality. Rather, my hope is that my observations on collegiality
here, and my effort to contextualize them within related literature on
both adjudication and group decision making, will serve as an invita169See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 10, at 12 n.63 (drawing on interviews with judges
on
collegiality).
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tion to further interdisciplinary research.""0 I also hope I have been
able to convey the vital importance of collegiality to the judicial function. For, in my view, collegiality invokes the highest ideals and aspirations ofjudging.

170

"It inakes no sense to talk abotit legal materials without reference to OtIr goals

for society, which entail extralegal forms of knowledge and inquiry. However, legal
scholars and educators have a unique obligation to employ some pragmatism when
engaging with other disciplines." Edwards, R'/lections, suprinote 6, at 2003.

